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PATENT INJUNCTIONS ON APPEAL:  
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE FEDERAL  
CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF EBAY 
Ryan T. Holte
*
 & Christopher B. Seaman
**
 
Abstract: More than ten years after the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision 
in eBay v. MercExchange, the availability of injunctive relief in patent cases remains hotly 
contested. For example, in a recent decision in the long-running litigation between Apple and 
Samsung, members of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit divided 
sharply on whether an injunction was warranted to prevent Samsung from continuing to 
infringe several smartphone features patented by Apple. To date, however, nearly all 
empirical scholarship regarding eBay has focused on trial court decisions, rather than the 
Federal Circuit. 
This Article represents the first comprehensive empirical study of permanent injunction 
decisions by the Federal Circuit following eBay. Through an original dataset on appeals from 
almost 200 patent cases, we assess the impact of the Federal Circuit on the availability of 
permanent injunctions. The findings from this study indicate the Federal Circuit is generally 
more favorable to prevailing patentees regarding injunctive relief than the district courts 
following eBay. District courts that grant an injunction after a finding of liability are highly 
likely to be affirmed on appeal, whereas district courts that deny an injunction have a 
statistically significant lower affirmance rate. This suggests the Federal Circuit is generally 
inclined toward a property rule rather than a liability rule as a remedy against future patent 
infringement. It also appears to lend support to claims by scholars and others that the Federal 
Circuit, as a specialized court with a large number of patent cases, is more pro-patentee than 
the generalist district courts. Finally, the implications of this and other empirical findings 
from the study are considered. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Permanent injunctions are strong medicine in patent disputes. An 
injunction allows the patent owner to exclude others from using or 
practicing the patented technology without permission, under penalty of 
contempt of court.
1
 When faced with the prospect of a court-ordered 
injunction, “an infringer likely will be willing to settle the suit by paying 
                                                     
1. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 271(a) (2012) (preventing the infringer from making, using, selling, 
offering to sell, or importing any product that infringes the patent). 
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the patentee a higher price to practice the claimed invention,”
2
 often by 
passing the price increase along to consumers. 
Traditionally, nearly all patentees received a permanent injunction 
after prevailing on liability.
3
 But the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay 
v. MercExchange
4
 significantly changed this calculus, especially for 
non-practicing patentees, sometimes referred to as “patent trolls.”
5
 
Previous studies have found that after eBay, district courts “appear to 
have adopted a de facto rule against injunctive relief” for non-practicing 
patentees and other patent owners “who do not directly 
compete . . . against an infringer” in a product market.
6
 This rule, 
however, is in considerable tension with the Supreme Court’s holding 
that the trial court in eBay “erred in its categorical denial of injunctive 
relief” to a non-practicing patentee.
7
 In short, eBay has given lower 
courts significantly more discretion in deciding when to grant or deny 
injunctive relief in patent cases, and the district courts’ exercise of that 
discretion may conflict with the Supreme Court’s admonition against 
categorical rules regarding entitlement to an injunction. 
Although district courts’ application of eBay has been widely 
studied,
8
 the role of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
                                                     
2. Daniel C. Tucker, Note, We Can’t Stay This Way: Changing the Standard for Staying 
Injunctions Pending Appeal After eBay, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1276, 1281 (2011). 
3. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(“From at least the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of 
infringement in the vast majority of patent cases.”). 
4. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
5. See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An 
Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1983 fig.1, 1988 fig.3 (2016) (finding that injunctions 
were granted 72.5% of the time after eBay, but only 16% of the time for PAEs); infra notes 92–93 
and accompanying text (describing the patent troll label). This Article uses the acronym “PAE” to 
refer to a patentee’s business model based primarily on the licensing and/or litigation of patents 
rather than the development and manufacturing of products. See Seaman, supra, at 1952 n.8 and 
accompanying text. 
6. Seaman, supra note 5, at 1953; see also Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, 
the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012) (finding that of all patentees, 
“PAEs are least likely to obtain an injunction; they tend to succeed in their requests only when the 
defendant fails to object”); Karen E. Sandrik, Reframing Patent Remedies, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 95, 
111 (2012) (noting that non-practicing patentees “are hard pressed to get an injunction” after eBay). 
7. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 394; see also John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2113–14 (2007) (asserting that “district courts’ post-eBay practice” of denying 
injunctive relief to PAEs “may be in some tension with the Supreme Court’s warning against the 
categorical denial of injunctive relief to broad classes of patent holders” (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
8. See generally Chien & Lemley, supra note 6 (analyzing 192 district court decisions post-
eBay); Benjamin H. Diessel, Note, Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the Emerging Market 
Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
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Circuit—which decides nearly all appeals in patent cases—has been less 
critically examined.
9
 Indeed, the Federal Circuit itself often appears to 
be split regarding the appropriate circumstances for granting an 
injunction. Some panel opinions stress that patents confer strong 
“property rights” that are consistent with “granting injunctive 
relief . . . in the vast majority of patent cases,”
10
 while other members of 
the court caution that there is a “clear Supreme Court standard” against a 
“general rule that a successful [patentee] is entitled to an injunction.”
11
 
For instance, in a recent decision in the long-running, billion-dollar 
patent litigation between technology titans Apple and Samsung, a 
divided Federal Circuit panel sharply split over application of eBay’s 
four-factor test to Apple’s patents covering several minor features 
incorporated in various smartphones and tablet computers, writing three 
different opinions on the issue.
12
 To date, however, no published 
                                                     
305 (2007) (studying 25 district court decisions post-eBay); Douglas Ellis et al., The Economic 
Implications (and Uncertainties) of Obtaining Permanent Injunctive Relief After eBay v. 
MercExchange, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 437 (2008) (evaluating 36 district court decisions post-eBay); 
Ernest Grumbles III et al., The Three Year Anniversary of eBay v. MercExchange: A Statistical 
Analysis of Permanent Injunctions, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Nov. 2009, at 25 (assessing 67 district 
court decisions post-eBay); George M. Newcombe et al., Prospective Relief for Patent Infringement 
in a Post-eBay World, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 549, 559–60 (2008) (evaluating 38 district court 
decisions post-eBay); Benjamin Peterson, Note, Injunctive Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193 (2008) (analyzing 33 district court decisions post-eBay); Seaman, supra 
note 5 (empirically studying 218 district court decisions post-eBay); Stacy Streur, The eBay Effect: 
Tougher Standards but Courts Return to the Prior Practice of Granting Injunctions for Patent 
Infringement, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 67 (2009) (reviewing 68 district court decisions post-
eBay). 
9. Ryan T. Holte, The Misinterpretation of eBay v. MercExchange and Why: An Analysis of the 
Case History, Precedent, and Parties, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 677, 717 (2015) (stating that “additional 
comprehensive research into post-eBay injunction appeals at the Federal Circuit is needed”); see 
also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 772 (2004) (“Unfortunately, it is difficult to test the concerns that 
have been voiced about the [Federal Circuit] empirically, and few have tried.”). 
10. Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (internal quotations 
omitted); see also id. (affirming the district court’s decision to grant a permanent injunction because 
“the analysis by the district court proceeds under the long tradition of equity practice granting 
injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases” and because 
“patent property rights are especially difficult to protect with solely monetary relief because a 
calculating infringer may thus decide to risk a delayed payment to obtain use of valuable property 
without the owner’s permission” (internal quotations omitted)). 
11. Edwards Lifesciences AG v. CoreValve, Inc., 699 F.3d 1305, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Prost, J., 
concurring). 
12. Compare Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633, 639–47 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding 
that all four eBay factors weighed in favor of granting Apple a permanent injunction), and id. at 
648–56 (Reyna, J., concurring) (agreeing that eBay warranted an injunction for Apple and further 
reasoning that “infringement on the [patentee’s] right to exclude is an injury for which an injunction 
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scholarship has attempted a comprehensive empirical study of Federal 
Circuit decisions regarding permanent injunctions since eBay. 
To fill this important gap in the literature, we conducted an original 
study into Federal Circuit decisions in patent cases that reached a merits 
decision regarding a permanent injunction at the trial court level for a 
7½-year period following eBay.
13
 For this project, we coded appeals 
from nearly 200 patent cases involving contested permanent injunction 
decisions—representing all district court rulings on this issue during the 
study’s time period—for numerous criteria, including the duration and 
outcome of the appeal, panel composition, and the Federal Circuit’s 




The original dataset created for this study helps shed considerable 
light on the Federal Circuit’s decision-making regarding permanent 
injunctions in patent cases. Most notably, it finds a sharp and statistically 
significant split in affirmance rates depending on whether the district 
court granted or denied injunctive relief to the prevailing patentee.
15
 
Specifically, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court when it 
granted a permanent injunction nearly ninety percent of the time, but it 
affirmed only slightly over half the time when the district court denied 
an injunction.
16
 Furthermore, this finding was robust after controlling for 
other variables, such as whether the patentee was a non-practicing entity, 
whether the patentee and infringer were competitors, and the field of 
technology of the infringed patents.
17
 Additional descriptive results also 
reveal interesting patterns regarding the filing and pendency of Federal 
Circuit appeals,
18
 as well as the voting patterns of individual Federal 
Circuit judges regarding injunctive relief and citations to the two 
concurring opinions in eBay.
19
 
The balance of this Article is organized as follows. Part I first 
provides an overview of the eBay litigation, including the 2006 Supreme 
                                                     
can be granted”), with id. at 656–63 (Prost, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]his is not a close case” 
and contending that Apple failed to demonstrate irreparable harm). 
13. See infra section II.B (describing the study design); Seaman, supra note 5, at 1975–76 
(describing methods used to identify all patent cases involving a merits decision on permanent 
injunctions at the trial court level from May 2006 through December 2013). 
14. See infra notes 146–169 and accompanying text (describing variables coded). 
15. See infra section III.A.5. 
16. See infra section III.A.5 Figure 6. 
17. See infra section III.A.7. 
18. See infra sections III.A.1 & III.A.3. 
19. See infra sections III.A.6 & III.A.8. 
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Court decision. It then summarizes the theoretical distinction between 
property rules and liability rules for enforcing patent rights and details 
the results of previous empirical studies concerning district courts’ 
application of eBay. Next, it reviews the Federal Circuit’s central role in 
harmonizing and shaping patent law. Part II describes the research 
questions considered in this empirical study and the methodology used 
to address them. Part III discusses the study’s findings and their 
implications, as well as individual case details for the few Federal 
Circuit cases where injunctions were denied by the district court and 
affirmed on appeal, or injunctions were granted by the district court but 
overturned by the Federal Circuit.  
I. BACKGROUND 
To assist in evaluating the Federal Circuit’s role in patent injunctions 
post-eBay, this section first discusses the history of eBay v. 
MercExchange, including the parties, procedural history, and Supreme 
Court decision. It then discusses the impact of eBay on district courts, 
most notably the shift by district courts away from a property rule 
approach for non-practicing patent owners. Finally, it reviews the 
Federal Circuit’s role in harmonizing patent law as well as past 
scholarship suggesting that the Federal Circuit may be more pro-
patentee than district courts in its application of patent law. 
A. The eBay Decision and Its Impact 
1. The Parties and Lower Court Decisions 
The eBay saga begins with the mid-1990’s founding of 
MercExchange by former CIA engineer Tom Woolston.
20
 
MercExchange’s business was initially directed towards collectible sales 
via e-commerce, with the focus of its plans centered on Woolston’s 1995 
patent application for trusted computer-based sales between parties 
unaffiliated with one another.
21
 MercExchange’s dispute with eBay 
started in 2000, when MercExchange began experiencing financial 
                                                     
20. Ryan T. Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors: Case Studies of Patent Assertion Entities, 59 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 24 (2013) (citing Transcript of Record at 308–15, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, 
Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003) (No. 2:01-CV-736)). Woolston’s company was first 
named Fleanet, then it was changed to MercExchange during the time that the first patent 
application was pending. Id. After founding Fleanet, Woolston received a law degree from the 
George Washington University School of Law. Id. 
21. U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265 (filed Nov. 7, 1995) (issued Dec. 1, 1998); Holte, supra note 20,  
at 26–27. 
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problems and eBay—prior to any alleged infringement—expressed 
interest in purchasing MercExchange’s patent portfolio.
22
 
After a few months of unsuccessful negotiation, MercExchange 
believed that eBay was “looking for ways to kill the patents instead of 
buying them.”
23
 The negotiations ended, and—according to 
MercExchange—eBay then began infringing the Woolston patents.
24
 
MercExchange then sued eBay for patent infringement in September 
2001 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia, where MercExchange was based.
25
 
After a five-week trial in 2003, a jury found Woolston’s original ‘265 
patent (and one other patent in the same family as the ‘265 patent) not 
invalid and infringed, and it awarded MercExchange $35 million in 
damages.
26
 MercExchange subsequently moved for entry of a permanent 
injunction, which the district court denied.
27
 While recognizing “the 
grant of injunctive relief against the infringer is considered the norm,” 
the district court stated that it was required to consider “traditional 
equitable principles,” including “(i) whether the plaintiff would face 
irreparable injury if the injunction did not issue, (ii) whether the plaintiff 
has an adequate remedy at law, (iii) whether granting the injunction is in 




After evaluating these factors, the district court found none of them 
weighed in favor of granting an injunction, placing particular emphasis 
on evidence of MercExchange’s “willingness to license its patents, its 
lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents, and its comments 
to the media as to its intent with respect to enforcement of its patent 
rights.”
29
 The district court ultimately concluded that eBay successfully 
rebutted the presumption that MercExchange would suffer irreparable 
harm absent an injunction.
30
 
                                                     
22. Holte, supra note 20, at 29. 
23. Julia Wilkinson, The eBay Patent Wars: Interview with MercExchange CEO Thomas 
Woolston (Sept. 30, 2004), https://web.archive.org/web/20160305045459/http://www.ecommerce 
bytes. com/cab/abn/y04/m09 /i30/s01 [https://perma.cc/Y3VC-GYUJ]. 
24. Id.  
25. Complaint for Patent Infringement, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 
(E.D. Va. 2003) (No. 2:01-CV-736). 
26. MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 698–99. 
27. Id. at 710–15. 
28. Id. at 711. 
29. Id. at 712. 
30. Id. 
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Both MercExchange and eBay appealed to the Federal Circuit on 
various grounds. The Federal Circuit issued a seventeen-page opinion in 
March 2005, addressing the injunction issue in just over one page.
31
 
Reversing the denial of a permanent injunction, the Federal Circuit did 
not cite the four-factor equitable test applied by the district court. 
Instead, the court began its analysis by declaring “the general rule is that 
a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have 
been adjudged.”
32
 It went on to state “a court may decline to enter an 
injunction” only in unusual circumstances, such as “when ‘a patentee’s 
failure to practice the patented invention frustrates an important public 
need for the invention,’ such as . . . to protect public health.”
33
 
The court then found that the district court erred in a number of areas. 
First, regarding the district court’s concern over the issuance of 
business-method patents, the Federal Circuit stated “[a] general concern 
regarding business-method patents [ ] is not the type of important public 
need that justifies the unusual step of denying injunctive relief.”
34
 
Second, regarding MercExchange’s public statements describing its 
willingness to license the patents at issue, the Federal Circuit stated 
“[i]njunctions are not reserved for patentees who intend to practice their 
patents . . . [i]f the injunction gives [MercExchange] additional leverage 
in licensing, that is a natural consequence of the right to exclude . . . ”
35
 
Finally, the Federal Circuit concluded its discussion of the injunction 
issue by holding that “[w]e therefore see no reason to depart from the 
general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent 
infringement absent exceptional circumstances.”
36
 
2. The Supreme Court’s Decision and Concurring Opinions 
eBay filed its petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court on 
July 25, 2005,
37
 MercExchange filed an opposition,
38
 and on November 
                                                     
31. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
32. Id. at 1338 (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 
1989)). 
33. Id. (quoting Rite–Hite Corp. v. Kelley, Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). 
34. Id. at 1339. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-
130), 2005 WL 1801263. 
38. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 
388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2005 WL 2396812. 
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28, 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions.
39
 The 
first question was whether the Federal Circuit erred in employing a 
general rule of issuing a permanent injunction after a finding of 
infringement.
40
 The second question was whether the Supreme Court 
should “reconsider its precedents, including Continental Paper Bag Co. 
v. Eastern Bag Company,”
41




On May 15, 2006, the Court unanimously reversed the Federal 
Circuit.
43
 Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for the Court. Chief 
Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion (joined by Justices Scalia and 
Ginsburg),
44
 as did Justice Kennedy (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter 
and Breyer).
45
 The Court’s opinion is succinct—less than five full pages 
in the official United States Reports—and holds that a federal court 
considering whether to award permanent injunctive relief to a prevailing 
plaintiff in a dispute arising under the Patent Act must apply “the four-
factor test historically employed by courts of equity.”
46
 The Supreme 
                                                     
39. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 546 U.S. 1029 (2005) (granting writ of certiorari). The 
Supreme Court did not invite the Solicitor General’s office “to file an amicus brief setting forth the 
government’s views as to whether the Court should grant certiorari in” the case. “Such invitations, 
which Supreme Court practitioners refer to as ‘Calls for Views of the Solicitor General’ or ‘CVSG’ 
orders, have been an accepted part of Supreme Court practice for about a half century.” John F. 
Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 
525 (2010). 
40. eBay Inc., 546 U.S. 1029. 
41. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908). 
42. Id.at 429 (“From the character of the right of the patentee we may judge of his remedies. It 
hardly needs to be pointed out that the right can only retain its attribute of exclusiveness by a 
prevention of its violation. Anything but prevention takes away the privilege which the law confers 
upon the patentee.”). The Court in Continental Paper Bag explained that the “no machine for 
practical manufacturing purposes was ever constructed under the” patent-in-suit, and that the 
patentee “locked up its patent” by “never attempt[ing] to make any practical use of it, either itself or 
through licenses.” Id. at 427–28. In addition, it stated that “[w]e have no doubt that the complainant 
stands in the common class of manufacturers who accumulate patents merely for the purpose of 
protecting their general industries and shutting out competitors.” Id. at 428. 
43. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006). 
44. Id. at 394–95 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
45. Id. at 395–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
46. Id. at 390. Despite the Court’s language, some remedies scholars have argued that this 
“historical” or “traditional” four-factor test for a permanent injunction was in fact neither historical 
nor traditional. See DOUGLAS C. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 426 (4th ed. 2010) (arguing that there was “no traditional four-part test” and that the 
Supreme Court majority’s citations supporting this test are misplaced in cases related to preliminary 
injunctions); Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. 
MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 76 n.71 (2007) (“Remedies specialists had never heard of the 
four-point test.”). But see Rachel Janutis, The Supreme Court’s Unremarkable Decision in eBay Inc. 
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 597, 597 (2010) (contending that “eBay is 
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Court acknowledged that patents confer “‘the right to exclude others 
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention,’”
47
 but the 
Federal Circuit failed to recite and apply “traditional equitable 
principles” in deciding whether an injunction was warranted: 
The [Federal Circuit] articulated a “general rule,” unique to 
patent disputes, “that a permanent injunction will issue once 
infringement and validity have been adjudged.” . . . Because we 
conclude that neither [the Federal Circuit nor the district court] 
correctly applied the traditional four-factor framework that 
governs the award of injunctive relief, we vacate the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals . . . .
48
 
The unanimous opinion contained two notable points regarding how 
courts should address these principles concerning to non-
commercializing patentees like MercExchange.
49
 First, regarding the 
district court’s rejection of an injunction based in part on 
MercExchange’s “‘lack of commercial activity in practicing the 
patent,’”
50
 the Court stated: 
[T]raditional equitable principles do not permit such broad 
classifications. For example, some patent holders, such as 
university researchers or self-made inventors, might reasonably 
prefer to license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to 
secure the financing necessary to bring their works to market 
themselves. Such patent holders may be able to satisfy the 
traditional four-factor test, and we see no basis for categorically 
denying them the opportunity to do so.
51
 
On this point, the Court concluded that the district court’s “analysis 
cannot be squared with the principles of equity adopted by Congress.”
52
 
Second, the Court relied on its 1908 decision in Continental Paper Bag, 
which held that courts can grant injunctive relief in favor of patent 
holders who “unreasonably decline[] to use [their] patent,” in holding 
                                                     
not a remarkable break from equitable practice. Indeed, the principles outlined by the Court in its 
decision are neither novel [n]or surprising when viewed in light of previous precedents.”). 
47. eBay Inc., 394 U.S. at 392 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006)). 
48. Id. at 393–94 (citations omitted). 
49. Holte, supra note 9, at 700. 
50. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 393. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
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Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion was only two paragraphs in 
length and focused on the historical precedent of injunctions in patent 
cases. After noting that the Court’s majority holding rested upon 
traditional notions of equity, the Chief Justice went into a discussion of 
that tradition vis-à-vis patent cases: since the early nineteenth century, 
“courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in 
the vast majority of patent cases.”
54
 In the Chief Justice’s opinion, this 
traditional practice was not surprising “given the difficulty of protecting 
a right to exclude through monetary remedies that allow an infringer to 
use an invention against the patentee’s wishes.”
55
 Chief Justice Roberts 
concluded the concurrence by citing Justice Holmes: “a page of history 




Justice Kennedy’s three-paragraph concurring opinion
57
 first 
supported the Court’s opinion regarding the “well-established, four-
factor test . . . in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief in patent 
cases.”
58
 Second, Justice Kennedy agreed with Chief Justice Roberts 
regarding the “lesson of the historical practice” in determining injunctive 
                                                     
53. Id. at 393–94. One author has previously argued the Court affirmed the Continental Paper 
Bag case in eBay. See Holte, supra note 9, at 701 (noting that in regards to a non-practicing patent 
holder, the Continental opinion states: “Standing alone, nonuse is no efficient reason for 
withholding injunction. There are many reasons for non-use which, upon explanation, are 
cogent . . . . Anything but prevention takes away the privilege which the law confers upon the 
patentee.”). Other commentators have argued that eBay’s generalities about equities stand in 
significant tension with the argument and holding from Continental. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, The 
Conceptual Relation Between IP Rights and Infringement Remedies, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 825, 
833 (2015). 
54. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
55. Id. (emphasis in original). 
56. Id. (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)); see also Jay Dratler, Jr., 
eBay’s Practical Effect: Two Differing Visions, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 35, 43 (2008) (“The 
thrust of [Roberts’] concurrence was that the results of permanent-injunction hearings in patent 
cases need not change drastically as a result of the Court’s unanimous insistence on a four-factor 
equitable analysis.”). 
57. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy characterized the 
concurrence as mere “observations” and only cited to a single authority to support his views—a 
2003 FTC report summarizing a panel discussion concerning “The Rise of Non-Practicing Entities” 
in the computer hardware industry. Id. (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: 
THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 38–39 (2003), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-
competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY6M-MK7H]). 
58. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
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 However, Kennedy’s concurrence then sharply departed from 
Roberts’; specifically, Justice Kennedy contended that “[b]oth the terms 
of the Patent Act and the traditional view of injunctive relief accept that 
the existence of a right to exclude does not dictate the remedy for a 
violation of that right.”
60
 The opinion then asserted that modern patent 
cases often differed from historical patent litigation in several important 
ways, including the role of non-practicing patentees who employ 
injunctive relief “as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to 
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.”
61
 Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence also explained that injunctions may be 
inappropriate “[w]hen the patented invention is but a small component 
of the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an 
injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations.”
62
 
Finally, it pointed to the “burgeoning number of patents over business 
methods,” some of which allegedly suffered from “potential vagueness 




3. eBay After Remand and Its Legacy 
While the landmark Supreme Court decision in eBay is fundamental 
to the post-2006 changes in patent injunction jurisprudence, the 
aftermath and conclusion of the eBay litigation itself also appears to 
have played a significant role in the decision’s impact.
 
Upon remand 
from the Supreme Court, and applying the four-factor test mandated by 
the Court’s decision, the district court again denied injunctive relief to 
MercExchange.
64
 In a detailed written decision issued on July 27, 2007, 
the district court again found that three of the four eBay equitable factors 
weighed against granting MercExchange an injunction.
65
 The district 
court’s decision after remand was the final injunction decision in the 
                                                     
59. Id. at 396. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id at 397. 
63. Id.; see also Holte, supra note 9, at 703 (arguing that “given that the Kennedy concurrence 
was self-described as ‘observations,’ the FTC report citation was simply a summary of testimony 
related to an off subject discussion (computer hardware),” and that “[t]he briefing and oral argument 
before the Court deeply considered injunctions for specific classes of patents, and the unanimous 
Opinion of the Court explicitly affirmed Continental—the concurrence can truly only be considered 
a general ‘observation’ by a minority of the Court, with no precedential value or citation intended”). 
64. MercExchange L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 559 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
65. Id. at 569–91. 
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case and has been widely cited by district courts when applying eBay to 
prevailing patentees in their courts.
66
 
A detailed analysis of the district court’s reasoning on remand is 
beyond this Article’s scope;
67
 however, an important point regarding the 
court’s decision to again deny an injunction was its discussion critiquing 
Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence
68
 and its multiple references to 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.
69
 Among other things, the district court 
cited Justice Kennedy for the proposition that “[u]tilization of a ruling in 
equity as a bargaining chip suggests both that such party never deserved 
a ruling in equity and that money is all that such party truly seeks, 
rendering monetary damages an adequate remedy in the first instance” 
and that MercExchange’s “post-trial attempt to sell off its intellectual 




Other district courts considering permanent injunctions in patent 
infringement cases have regularly cited the district court’s post-remand 
opinion in eBay and applied similar reasoning.
71
 In a previous article, 
                                                     
66. See Holte, supra note 9, at 730 (noting that “Judge Friedman’s second denial of the 
injunction” after remand and MercExchange’s subsequent settlement left it as “the final opinion in 
the case”). The district court’s opinion denying a permanent injunction after remand in eBay has 
been cited in over 60 sixty subsequent district court decisions as of July 2016, most of which 
involved permanent injunction requests. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 556. 
67. For further analysis of the district court’s 2007 decision, see Holte, supra note 9, at 706–14, 
and Seaman, supra note 5, at 1967–68. 
68. For instance, responding to the statement in Roberts’ concurrence that “a page of history is 
worth a volume of logic” regarding permanent injunctions, the district court countered that “[t]he 
factual history of this matter indicates that MercExchange has never sought to defend its right to 
exclude,” suggesting that it was “merely seeking an injunction as a bargaining chip to increase the 
bottom line.” MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 588. 
69. Id. at 574, 582, 586 (citing Kennedy’s concurring opinion four times); see also Holte, supra 
note 9, at 711 (“Judge Friedman’s take on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was far more agreeable 
[than Roberts’ concurrence], if not precedential.”); Rendleman, supra note 46, at 83 n.108 (“On 
remand, . . . the trial judge rejected MercExchange’s renewed motion for a permanent injunction in 
a detailed and factual patent-specific opinion influenced by Justice Kennedy’s injunction-skeptical 
concurring opinion.”). 
70. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 582 (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C.,  547 U.S. 
388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also Robert Reis, Rights and Remedies Post eBay v. 
MercExchange—Deep Waters Stirred, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 133, 150–52 (2008) 
(summarizing the district court’s decision after remand regarding the first two eBay factors and 
citations to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence).  
71. See, e.g., Open Text, S.A. v. Box, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 885, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Although 
the ‘quantum of evidence’ required to prove irreparable harm is unclear, case law is clear that the 
potential for loss of market share is insufficient.” (citing MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 577)); 
ePlus Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 459, 467 (E.D. Va. 2013) (noting the overlap 
between the adequate remedy at law and irreparable harm factors in eBay (citing MercExchange, 
500 F. Supp. 2d at 582)), vacated by 789 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. 
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Ryan Holte argued that district courts’ reliance on Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence as precedent resulted in a misinterpretation of eBay’s 
holding.
72
 This issue was compounded by the February 2008 settlement 
of the case before the Federal Circuit had opportunity to weigh in on the 
                                                     
Interlace Medical, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 2d 69, 78 (D. Mass. 2013) (explaining that the PTO’s 
preliminary rejection of the patents during reexamination weakens the plaintiff’s ability to show 
irreparable harm (citing MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 575 n.15)); Layne Christensen Co. v. 
Bro-Tech Corp., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1117 (D. Kan. 2012) (noting that “irreparable harm had not 
been shown in part because the patentee had consistently licensed the patent instead of engaging in 
commercial activity in practicing the patent.” (citing MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 570–71)); 
ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 641, 648 (E.D. Va. 2011) 
(analogizing the patentee-in-suit to MercExchange, who both engaged in “‘a consistent course of 
litigating or threatening litigation to obtain money damages’” and “‘utilized its patents as a sword to 
extract money rather than as a shield to protect . . . its market-share, reputation, goodwill, or name 
recognition’” (quoting MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 572)), denial of injunction rev’d, 694 
F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Belden Techs., Inc. v. Superior Essex Commc’ns LP, 802 F. Supp. 2d 
555, 578 (D. Del. 2011) (differentiating between entities who use third-party licensing to bring 
concepts to market and those who “‘strategically utilize[e] a patent to excise a tax from companies 
already participating in the market’” (quoting MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 583 n.24)); Metso 
Minerals, Inc. v. Powerscreen Intern. Distribution Ltd., 788 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(noting that “on remand from [the] Supreme Court, [the district court] declin[ed] to grant injunctive 
relief where it appeared that the patent holder was ‘merely seeking an injunction as a bargaining 
chip to increase the bottom line.’” (quoting MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 588)); ePlus, Inc. v. 
Lawson Software, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-620, 2011 WL 2119410, at *6 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2011) 
(explaining that the patentee must carry the burden of “demonstrat[ing] how and why its harm is 
irreparable” (citing MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 577)); Enpat, Inc. v. Budnic, No. 6:11-CV-
86, 2011 WL 1196420, at *3 (M.D. Fl. Mar. 29, 2011) (“However, ‘the [c]ourt is not blind to the 
reality that the nature of the right protected by a patent, the right to exclude, will frequently result in 
a plaintiff successfully establishing irreparable harm in the wake of establishing validity and 
infringement.’” (quoting MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 568)); Arlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., No. 3:01-CV-0485, 2010 WL 817519, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010) 
(stating that the public interest factor in eBay “typically ‘favors the patentee, given the public’s 
interest in maintaining the integrity of the patent system’” (quoting MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d 
at 586)); Joyal Prods., Inc. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., No. 04-5172, 2009 WL 512156, at *11 
(D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2009) (distinguishing the patentee-in-suit from entities like MercExchange “who 
widely licensed their patents” (citing MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 569)); Trading Techs. Int’l, 
Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2008 WL 4531371, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2008) (“The eBay 
district court, along with numerous other courts, has since decided that no presumption can exist 
under relevant case law and the language of the Supreme Court’s decision.” (citing MercExchange, 
500 F. Supp. 2d at 568)); see also Holte, supra note 9, at 722–23 (“Simply looking at citations to 
Judge Friedman’s 2007 denial of MercExchange’s renewed motion for injunction reveals at least 
thirteen citations within cases considering permanent injunctions for unrelated patent infringement 
cases.”). 
72. See Holte, supra note 9, at 721 (“In reviewing post-eBay injunction cases, many other 
scholars have concluded ‘a review of post-eBay federal district court decisions shows that though it 
is not the opinion of the Court, [Justice] Kennedy’s concurrence has proven to be highly 
persuasive.’” (quoting Golden, supra note 6, at 2113 (“District courts have responded in apparent 
lockstep to Justice Kennedy’s concerns about trolls.”)); LAYCOCK, supra note 46, at 427 (“The only 
hint of what should have been the real issue in eBay comes in the penultimate paragraph of Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion.”). 
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district court’s second injunction denial, thus leaving the post-remand 
decision as the final public word on this issue.
73
 
Another point of interest is the voluminous media coverage regarding 
the eBay case,
74
 which was overwhelmingly anti-“patent troll.”
75
 
According to an empirical study by Lisa Dolak and Blaine Bettinger, 
press coverage of eBay coincided with the injunction appeal in the NTP 
v. Research in Motion
76
 case from the same district,
77
 which threatened 
to shut down Blackberry’s then-popular messaging service.
78
 Although it 
is not possible to determine whether any members of the Court were 
aware of or influenced by media coverage of the eBay or NTP cases, as 
Dolak and Bettinger note, “that coverage . . . contained significant 
discussion of particular considerations that were potentially relevant to 
the resolution of the question at issue in eBay, and ultimately expressly 
regarded as relevant by four of the Justices” in Kennedy’s concurrence.
79
 
B. Property Rules, Liability Rules, and District Courts’ Application of 
eBay 
Previous studies of eBay’s impact in the district courts suggest that it 
has created a bifurcated regime of patent remedies, where some 
patentees are generally awarded a property-rule remedy (via an 
injunction against future infringement), while others are limited to a 
                                                     
73. See Holte, supra note 9, at 730 (“Should MercExchange not have settled before the Federal 
Circuit had opportunity to reverse [the district court] a second time, perhaps the eBay Supreme 
Court opinion might be interpreted differently . . . as opposed to an anti-patentee district court judge 
having the final word.”). 
74. See Lisa A. Dolak & Blaine T. Bettinger, eBay and the BlackBerry®: A Media Coverage 
Case Study, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 12 (2008) (explaining that among patent-law related 
articles in their dataset, “eBay received more coverage than any of the other Supreme Court cases 
pending or decided during the [two-and-a-half year] study period”). 
75. See Holte, supra note 9, at 703–06 (discussing press coverage of the eBay litigation). Cf. 
Edward Lee, Patent Trolls: Moral Panics, Motions of Limine, and Patent Reform, 19 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 113, 127–33 (2015) (conducting an empirical study of mass media’s coverage of non-
practicing patentees and finding that “the term ‘patent troll’ is, by far, the most frequently used term 
by the media” post-eBay). For further detail regarding the “patent troll” label, see infra notes 92–93 
and accompanying text. This Article uses the acronym PAE (patent assertion entity) in lieu of patent 
troll. See Seaman, supra note 5, at 1952 & n.9.  
76. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., No. 3:01-CV-767, 2003 WL 23100881 (E.D. Va. Aug. 
5, 2003). 
77. Dolak & Bettinger, supra note 74, at 13, 20–26. 
78. NTP, Inc., 2003 WL 23100881 (granting permanent injunction to NTP but staying the 
injunction pending appeal), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part and remanded, 418 F.3d 
1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
79. Dolak & Bettinger, supra note 74, at 31. 
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liability rule (usually monetary compensation, such as an ongoing 
royalty). 
The distinction between property rules and liability rules for 
enforcing legal rights (also called entitlements) traces back to Guido 
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed’s groundbreaking article, Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.
80
 
Under a property rule, an entitlement can only be taken or transferred 
with the owner’s consent, which the owner is free to withhold.
81
 In 
contrast, a liability rule exists when another party may violate an 
entitlement if it is “willing to pay an objectively determined value for 
it.”
82
 Thus, unlike a property rule, “a liability rule denies the holder of 
the [entitlement] the power to exclude others.”
83
 Injunctive relief is the 
primary means for enforcing a property rule, while monetary 
compensation is normally granted for breaching a liability rule.
84
 
Historically, prevailing patentees have been entitled to the property-
rule remedy of injunctive relief.
85
 As Chief Justice Roberts noted in a 
                                                     
80. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of The Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972). 
81. See id. at 1105 (explaining that under a “property rule,” “[n]o one can take the 
entitlement . . . unless the holder sells it willingly and at the price at which [the holder] subjectively 
values the property”); Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2655 (1994) (“A property rule is a legal entitlement that can only be 
infringed after bargaining with the entitlement holder.”). 
82. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 80, at 1092. 
83. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 
YALE L.J. 2091, 2091 (1997). 
84. See Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 
106 YALE L.J. 2149, 2150–51 (1997) (identifying injunctions with property rules and damages with 
liability rules); Merges, supra note 81, at 2655 (explaining that “injunctions [are] the classic 
instance of a property rule,” while “[u]nder a liability rule . . . a tribunal will determine the 
appropriate compensation in an ex post proceeding”). As Calabresi and Melamed themselves note, 
however, the categories of property rules and liability rules “are not . . . absolutely distinct.” 
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 80, at 1092. For instance, if monetary remedies are sufficiently 
high, they can operate like a property rule because potential takers of an entitlement would be 
deterred from doing so due to the high cost. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: 
Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1040–41 (1995) 
(explaining that with “relatively high damages, potential takers would be deterred from 
nonconsensual takings, and the entitlement would be transferred only by consensual agreement”); 
Douglas Laycock, The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship (and the Doctrinal Train Wreck in 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement), 4 J. TORT L. 1, 1 (2012) (explaining that “supracompensatory 
remedies . . . can function as liability rules rather than property rules”). 
85. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 
255 (1994) (“Remedies for infringement of a patent are, with limited exceptions, those appropriate 
for property. Injunctions . . . are available against infringers on proof of validity and 
infringement.”); Merges, supra note 81, at 2662 (noting the “strong property rule baseline of 
intellectual property law”).  
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concurring opinion in eBay, “[f]rom at least the early 19th century, 
courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in 
the vast majority of patent cases.”
86
 Prior to eBay, the Federal Circuit 




Recently, however, some scholars and judges have argued in favor of 
imposing liability rules for patent infringement, at least in certain 
situations.
88
 These circumstances may include when transaction costs 
would prevent the parties from reaching a mutually beneficial 
agreement,
89
 or when a patent owner uses the prospect of injunctive 
relief to extract compensation significantly in excess of the patent’s 
economic value, a situation referred to as “holdup.”
90
 
                                                     
86. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
87. See, e.g., In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The patent right is a right to 
exclude . . . . The essence of all property is the right to exclude, and the patent property right is 
certainly not inconsequential.”); Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983) (“The patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very definition of ‘property.’”). 
88. See, e.g., Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Under 
some circumstances, awarding an ongoing royalty for patent infringement in lieu of an injunction 
may be appropriate.”); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (E.D. Tex. 
2006) (“[A] violation of the right to exclude does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that a patent 
holder cannot be adequately compensated by remedies at law such as monetary damages . . . .”), 
aff’d on other grounds, 507 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 
TEX. L. REV. 253, 256 (2009) (contending that “liability treatment for intellectual rights may be 
preferable” in cases where the right to exclude is less important); Timothy R. Holbrook, 
Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2009) (proposing 
adoption of a liability rule for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); Mark A. Lemley & 
Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 784 
(2007) (arguing that liability rules are preferable when injunctive relief cannot be narrowly 
tailored); see also eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that “legal 
damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve 
the public interest” when “the patented invention is but a small component of the product” and 
when “the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations”). 
89. See Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 706 n.9 (1996) (“[L]egal scholars have interpreted Calabresi and 
Melamed to be saying that property rules are more efficient when transaction costs are low.”); 
Merges, supra note 81, at 2655 (“Ever since Calabresi and Melamed, transaction costs have 
dominated the choice of the proper entitlement rule, with a liability rule being the entitlement of 
choice when transaction costs are high.”). 
90. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE 
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 26 (2011) (“An injunction’s ability to cause patent hold-up can 
support withholding injunctive relief in some situations. A manufacturer’s high switching costs 
combined with the threat of an injunction can allow a patent owner to obtain payments unrelated to 
the economic value of its invention.”); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Hold-Up and 
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007) (“[T]he threat of an injunction can enable a 
patent holder to negotiate royalties far in excess of the patent holder’s true economic 
contribution.”). Other legal and economics scholars have questioned whether holdup is a significant 
problem. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically 
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Several prior empirical studies have sought to evaluate eBay’s impact 
by reviewing district court decisions on permanent injunctions in patent 
cases. Although these studies evaluated different time periods, they 
generally agree that patent owners who prevail in litigation receive an 
injunction (a property rule) about three-quarters of the time post-eBay.
91
 
However, certain categories of patentees are much less successful at 
obtaining injunctive relief, most notably “patent assertion entities” 
(PAEs), which are firms that principally exploit their patents through 
litigation and/or licensing rather than direct commercialization.
92
 These 
previous studies show that PAEs—sometimes pejoratively called “patent 
trolls”
93
—generally receive only monetary compensation (a liability 
rule) instead of an injunction against future infringement.
94
 
                                                     
Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535 (2008); J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty 
Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley & 
Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714 (2008); see also Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Ross 
Levine, An Empirical Examination of Patent Holdup, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549, 552–54, 
570–72 (2015) (finding no empirical evidence to support the claim of holdup for standard-essential 
patents). 
91. See Chien & Lemley, supra note 6, at 9–10 & n.46 (reporting that “district courts . . . have 
granted about 75% of requests for injunctions” from July 2006 to August 2011); Ellis et al., supra 
note 8, at 441–42 n.35–36 (2008) (finding permanent injunctions awarded in 75% of district court 
decisions from May 2006 through January 2008); Grumbles et al., supra note 8, at 25 (reporting that 
permanent injunctions were awarded 72% of the time from May 2006 through May 2009); Petersen, 
supra note 8, at 197–98 (reporting that permanent injunctions were granted in 24 of 33 (73%) 
district court decisions from May 2006 through February 2008); Kirti Gupta & Jay P. Kesan, 
Studying the Impact of eBay on Injunctive Relief in Patent Cases 7 tbl.2 (July 10, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript) (reporting that district courts granted 308 of 384 motions (80%) for 
permanent injunctions from May 2006 through end of 2012); Docket Navigator, Success Rates for 
Permanent Injunctions After eBay v. MercExchange, DOCKET REP. (3:33 PM, Nov. 20, 2009), 
http://docketreport.blogspot.com/2009/11/success-rates-for-permanent-injunction.html 
[https://perma.cc/2F5E-AG85] (noting that 72% of motions seeking permanent injunction in patent 
cases from January 2008 through May 2009 were granted in whole or in part). 
92. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 90, at 220 n.21 (“This report uses the term ‘patent assertion 
entity’ [or PAE] . . . to refer to firms whose business model focuses on purchasing and asserting 
patents.”); Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and 
Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 328 (2010) (explaining that PAEs 
“are focused on the enforcement, rather than the active development or commercialization of their 
patents”). 
93. See, e.g., In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Plager, J., concurring) (“Patent 
trolls are also known by a variety of other names: ‘patent assertion entities’ (PAEs), [and] ‘non-
practicing entities’ (NPEs).”); Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., No. 13-CV-03999-BLF, 2015 
WL 4129193, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2015) (granting motion in limine prohibiting “derogatory” 
references about the patentee’s business, including terms “patent troll” and “patent assertion 
entity”); see also Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (“Trolls, in the patois of the patent community, are entities that hold patents 
for the primary purpose of enforcing them against alleged infringers, often exacting outsized 
licensing fees on threat of litigation.”); cf. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., __ U.S. __, 135 S. 
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To further investigate eBay’s impact, co-author Christopher Seaman 
conducted an empirical study of district court injunction decisions for a 
7½-year period following the Supreme Court’s decision (May 2006–
December 2013).
95
 This study confirmed that while most patentees still 
obtain injunctive relief, PAEs rarely do.
96
 This finding was statistically 
significant, even after controlling for other potential confounding factors 
like the field of technology of the infringed patent and the district court 
that decided the injunction request.
97
 As a result, this study concluded 
that “district courts appear to have adopted a de facto rule against 
injunctive relief for PAEs and other patent owners who do not directly 
compete . . . against an infringer”
98
—a rule which, ironically, is in 
tension with the Court’s conclusion in eBay that “the District Court erred 




Although these prior studies shed significant light on district courts’ 
application of eBay, they necessarily paint an incomplete picture because 
they are limited to only trial court decisions.
100
 The Federal Circuit, as 
the sole appellate court for claims arising under the Patent Act,
101
 plays a 
                                                     
Ct. 1920, 1932 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the Court’s decision “increases the in 
terrorem power of patent trolls”). 
94. Chien & Lemley, supra note 6, at 10 (finding that district courts granted injunctions to PAEs 
only 26% of the time, and only 7% of the time where the injunction request was contested by the 
infringer); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 90, at 256 (finding that “non-practicing 
patentees have been less likely than practicing patentees to receive injunctions”). 
95. See Seaman, supra note 5, at 1975. 
96. Id. at 1982–83 & fig.1, 1987–88 & fig.3 (finding injunctions were granted in 72.5% of district 
court decisions after eBay, but only 16% of the time for PAEs). 
97. Id. at 1996–98 & tbl.3 (finding that patentee’s status as PAE was statistically significant at the 
5% level in the most predictive model, and noting that even this model “probably tend[s] to 
underestimate the strength of the relationship between PAE status and injunctive relief” due to 
collinearity with a similar variable). 
98. Id. at 1953. 
99. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006); see also Mark P. Gergen, John 
M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent 
Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 244–45 (2012) (noting that although “[t]he Supreme Court’s 
eBay opinion specifically indicated that courts should not adopt a ‘categorical rule’ denying 
injunctions for nonpracticing entities . . . . commentators have reported that district courts’ actual 
practice appears substantially to conform to the forbidden rule”); Golden, supra note 7, at 2113–14 
(asserting that “district courts’ post-eBay practice” of denying injunctive relief to PAEs “may be in 
some tension with the Supreme Court’s warning against the ‘categorical denial of injunctive relief’ 
to broad classes of patent holders”). 
100. See Seaman, supra note 5, at 1982 (noting that “this study is limited to district court 
decisions; as a result, it does not consider the outcome of any appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit or the reasoning by that court for its decision”). 
101. 35 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). 
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central role in the shaping and application of patent law.
102
 It also serves 
as the final arbiter in most patent cases, as the Supreme Court only 
grants certiorari to, at best, a handful of patent cases each year.
103
 Thus, 
to fully appreciate how eBay has impacted the traditional property rule 
of injunctive relief for prevailing patentees, the Federal Circuit must be 
considered as well. Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation and 
application of eBay is highly relevant to the ongoing scholarly 
conversation regarding the Supreme Court’s increasing involvement in 
the field of patent law, which some have asserted is a response to the 
Federal Circuit’s alleged favoring of strong patent rights.
104
 
C. The Role and Function of the Federal Circuit 
The Federal Circuit’s role as the sole court of appeals in patent cases 
and its function of overseeing the various general-jurisdiction trial courts 
around the country are important reasons to study its jurisprudence 
regarding injunctive relief. Indeed, during oral arguments at the United 
States Supreme Court in eBay, Justice Ginsburg questioned eBay’s 
counsel, Carter G. Phillips, stating: “One of the problems with the 
district court exercising equitable discretion without a close review by 
the Federal Circuit is just the thing that the Federal Circuit was created 
                                                     
102. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1791, 1795 (2013) (explaining that “the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit[] has an 
enormous influence on patent law and innovation policy” due in part to its “near-exclusive 
jurisdiction over patent appeals”); see also infra section I.C (discussing the origins of the Federal 
Circuit and its intended role in harmonizing patent law). 
103. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of 
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 275–76 (noting that the Supreme Court “averaged barely one 
patent decision per year” between 1950 and 1980, and that “[t]he Federal Circuit was created in part 
because of the Supreme Court’s then decades-long neglect of the field” of patent law). Since 2000, 
however, the Supreme Court has become considerably more active in patent disputes, issuing over 
thirty merits decisions. Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION BLOG, 
http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html [https://perma.cc/RWB7-KBHK]. 
104. See Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1416 
(2016) (noting that many observers view the Supreme Court’s “significant[] increase[]” in “review 
of patent decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . . as attempts by the 
Supreme Court to rein in expansive Federal Circuit doctrine that has made it too easy to obtain 
patents and unduly enhanced their power”). But see Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme 
Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY 62, 76 (2013) (“One colorable explanation for the 
Supreme Court’s activity [in patent law] is that the Court has acted to combat the Federal Circuit’s 
pro-patent bias. That view of the Supreme court, however, is incomplete and ultimately 
unpersuasive.”). 
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Prior to the Federal Circuit, there was “widespread perception that the 
legal infrastructure of patent law was not being effectively managed.”
106
 
The influential Hruska Commission Report on the federal appellate 
system singled out patent law “as an area in which the application of the 
law to the facts of a case often produces different outcomes in different 
courtrooms in substantially similar cases.”
107
 Regional courts of appeal 
had developed reputations as “pro-patent . . . and anti-patent,”
108
 
resulting in widespread forum shopping by litigants in patent disputes.
109
 
The Hruska Commission report concluded that the situation 
“demean[ed] the entire judicial process and the patent system as well.”
110
 
The 1982 Federal Courts Improvement Act created the Federal 
Circuit to, among other things, “insure[] a more uniform interpretation of 
the patent laws and thus contribut[e] meaningfully and positively to 
predicting the strength of patents.”
111
 The adoption of a single tribunal 
                                                     
105. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006) (No. 05-130). A similar call for specialized courts came 100 years earlier from Judge 
Learned Hand:  
The court summons technical judges to whom technical questions are submitted and who can 
intelligently pass upon the issues without blindly groping among testimony upon matters 
wholly out of their ken. How long we shall continue to blunder along without the aid of 
unpartisan and authoritative scientific assistance in the administration of justice, no one knows; 
but all fair persons not conventionalized by provincial legal habits of mind ought, I should 
think, unite to effect some such advance.  
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). 
106. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical 
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1115 (2004). 
107. S. REP. NO. 97-295, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15 (citing SEN. ROMAN 
L. HRUSKA ET AL., COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, 
STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975) 
[hereinafter HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT]); see also Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift On A Sea Of 
Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal 
Circuit, 92 GEO. L.J. 523, 531 n.35 (2004) (“The Hruska Commission’s findings ‘that patent cases 
are inconsistently adjudicated’ were confirmed by the ‘great weight’ of testimony that Congress 
heard in the 96th and 97th Congresses, including from ‘distinguished jurists, patent practitioners, 
and representatives of major technologically-oriented business enterprises,’ testimony that ‘also 
supported the basic objective of providing for uniformity of doctrinal development in the patent 
area.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 15)). 
108. H.R. REP. NO. 97–312, at 20–21 (1982). 
109. See HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 107, at 220 (explaining that “the perceived 
disparity in results in different circuits” in patent cases “leads to widespread forum shopping”). 
110. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
111. Hearings on H.R. 6033, H.R. 6934, H.R. 3806 and H.R. 2414, Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 
797 (1980), http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/gdoc/hearings/8/81602054/81602054_5.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/PGA5-JUVL]; see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1982) (asserting that the Federal 
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for patent appeals was intended to yield a “more predictable patent law 
doctrine, reduce or eliminate forum shopping, and at least rationalize—if 
not strengthen—the patent grant.”
112
 As Tim Holbrook has explained, 
“[w]ith each decision, the Federal Circuit creates law at the national 
level, a role previously reserved for the Supreme Court.”
113
 Accordingly, 
since its commissioning, the Federal Circuit has served as “the manager 
and developer of [] patent law.”
114
 In addition, some scholars have 
argued that the Federal Circuit was established as “a ‘court with a 
mission’” to not only adjudicate cases, but also “serve as a maker of 
substantive patent policy” in the process.
115
 The Federal Circuit’s unique 
role in shaping patent law has even led some members of the Supreme 
Court to express concern “that th[is] specialized court may develop an 
institutional bias” favoring patent owners.
116
 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss has followed the Federal Circuit’s growth 
and impact in a series of articles,
117
 and concluded that “observers 
largely agree that . . . the Federal Circuit has vastly improved the patent 
system.”
118
 In her view, the court has made patent law more “accurate, 
precise, and coherent.”
119
 As a result, patents are likely more valuable 
                                                     
Circuit “will provide nationwide uniformity in patent law” and “make the rules applied in patent 
litigation more predictable”). Cf. Lee, supra note 104, at 1438 (discussing how the Supreme Court’s 
recent patent decisions may actually be working to curb “patent exceptionalism” by the Federal 
Circuit and specifically noting that the eBay “opinion exhibits a systematizing tone that repudiates 
any form of patent exceptionalism.”). In a strange twist of intent, however, the Supreme Court’s 
attempts at generalizing patent law in eBay with a traditional test inadvertently created a unique rule 
that was “developed for patent law [but] has become the standard for determining injunctions in a 
wide range of doctrinal areas as opposed to vice versa.” Id. at 1439.  
112. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 106, at 1115–16; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989) 
(“According to proponents of the [Federal Courts Improvement Act], channeling patent cases into a 
single appellate forum would create a stable, uniform law and would eliminate forum shopping.”). 
113. Holbrook, supra note 104, at 62. 
114. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 106, at 1116. 
115. John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 793–94 (2003) 
(quoting Control Res., Inc. v. Delta Elec., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 121, 123 (D. Mass. 2001)). 
116. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 825, 838–39 (2002) 
(Stevens, J., concurring); see also Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Metabolite Labs, Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (explaining that “this generalist Court could 
contribute to the important ongoing debate . . . as to whether the patent system, as currently 
administered and enforced, adequately reflects the careful balance that the federal patent laws 
embody” (internal quotations and modifications omitted)). 
117. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of 
Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787 (2008); Dreyfuss, supra note 9; Dreyfuss, supra note 112. 
118. Dreyfuss, supra note 9, at 800. 
119. Dreyfuss, supra note 112, at 24. 
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today than before 1982.
120
 While some commentators have asserted that 
the centralization of patent law has led to “capture” by pro-patent 
interests,
121
 “others argue that the apparent[] pro-patent shift has been 
accompanied by a more restrictive approach to patent breadth.”
122
 
In addition to this theoretical literature, numerous empirical studies 
have examined the Federal Circuit’s role in shaping patent law since 
1982.
123
 Although this empirical research is too extensive to summarize 
                                                     
120. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 25 (2d ed. 2001) (“The 
[Federal Circuit] ushered in a new approach to patent validity and defenses to infringement, 
resulting in a significant strengthening of the patent grant[‘s value]. . . .”); Wagner & Petherbridge, 
supra note 106, at 1116 & n.37 (“It is widely perceived that patents are more valuable today than 
before 1982. . . .”); cf. Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive 
Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 519 (2003) (“[I]ntellectual property has 
become more valuable, and the number of patents, copyrights, and trademarks has increased 
rapidly.”). 
121. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 69 (2008) (citing various empirical 
studies regarding the “pro-patent[ee] policies of the Federal Circuit”); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH 
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS 
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 104, 110 (2004) 
(contending that the Federal Circuit has “significantly broadened patent-holders’ rights” and that it 
has “systematically altered [patent law] in favor of the patent holders”); WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 335 (2003) 
(“The Federal Circuit has indeed turned out to be a pro-patent court . . . .”); Stuart Minor Benjamin 
& Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 
(2008) (concluding that the Federal Circuit’s behavior in challenges to patent validity is “arguably 
consistent with standard accounts of capture of regulatory processes by well-represented interest 
groups”); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on 
Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 822 (1988) (“Even with [the] safeguards [Congress imposed 
when it created the Federal Circuit], the Federal Circuit appears to be a ‘pro-patent’ court.”); see 
also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 251 (1998) (concluding that findings of patent validity have been significantly 
higher since the establishment of the Federal Circuit). 
122. David R. Pekarek Krohn & Emerson H. Tiller, Federal Circuit Patent Precedent: An 
Empirical Study of Institutional Authority and Intellectual Property Ideology, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 
1177, 1183 (2012); see also John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A 
Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 679 (2008) 
(asserting that the Federal Circuit’s “apparently pro-patent shift appears to have been accompanied 
by an effort to take a more restrictive approach to patent breadth. Under the Federal Circuit, patents 
may be more likely to be issued and upheld, but they may also be more likely to have a relatively 
narrow scope.”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent 
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1112 (2003) (“[T]he [Federal Circuit] has clearly not 
accepted the most assertive version of patents-as-ordinary-property claim, which counsels in favor 
of broad grants.”). 
123. For empirical scholarship regarding outcomes at the Federal Circuit generally, see, e.g., 
Donald R. Dunner, Introduction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—The 
First Three Years, 13 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1985); Donald R. Dunner, J. Michael Jakes & Jeffrey D. 
Karceski, A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit’s Patent Decisions: 1982–1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 
151 (1995); Ted L. Field, “Judicial Hyperactivity” in the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Study, 46 
U.S.F. L. REV. 721 (2012); Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the 
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here, several studies are worth mentioning regarding the Federal 
Circuit’s impact in strengthening patent rights and harmonizing patent 
law. 
First, an empirical study by Matthew Henry and John Turner used a 
data set of patent litigation from 1953–2002 to compare appellate 
decisions before and after the creation of the Federal Circuit.
124
 The 
results of this study support the perception of “the ‘pro-patent’ nature” 
of that court, at least with respect to decisions regarding patent 
validity.
125
 Specifically, Henryand Turner found that the Federal Circuit 
“has been significantly more reluctant than its predecessors to affirm 
[district court] decisions of [patent] invalidity.”
126
 Further, “district 




                                                     
Federal Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL. STUD. 85 (2006); Kimberly A. Moore, 
Judges, Juries and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 
(2000). For empirical scholarship regarding invalidity and unenforceability decisions by the Federal 
Circuit, see, for example, John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in 
Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745 (2000); Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness 
and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 
(2007); Jennifer Nock & Sreekar Gadde, Raising the Bar for Nonobviousness: An Empirical Study 
of Federal Circuit Case Law Following KSR, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 369 (2011); Lee Petherbridge, Jason 
Rantanen & Ali Mojibi, The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1293 (2011); Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and 
Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051 (2007); 
Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study, 16 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709 (2013). For empirical scholarship regarding claim construction decisions 
by the Federal Circuit, see, for example, J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: 
A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 
1 (2013); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001); David. L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical 
Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008); David 
L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073 (2010); Wagner & 
Petherbridge, supra note 106. 
124. Henry & Turner, supra note 123, at 95. Henry & Turner identified 3,268 appeals decisions 
from cases reported in the United States Patent Quarterly. Id. at 99–100. Of these appeals, 1,927 
were issued by the regional circuit court of appeals, while 1,341 were issued by the Federal Circuit. 
Id. at 100–01 & tbl.1. 
125. Id. at 85. However, Henry & Turner also found that the Federal Circuit’s creation did not 
result in a statistically significant change regarding the affirmance of non-infringement decisions. 
Id. at 85, 112. 
126. Id. at 85; see also id. at 112 (“The [Federal Circuit] has affirmed decisions of invalidity 
significantly less often, [and] patentees have appealed decisions of invalidity significantly more 
often . . . . ”). Cf. Scott E. Atkinson, Alan C. Marco & John L. Turner, The Economics of a 
Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411, 
421 (2009) (finding the variance of the regional circuits’ validity rates in patent cases was six times 
as large prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit). 
127. Henry & Turner, supra note 123, at 112.  
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Second, David Pekarek Krohn and Emerson Tiller compared citations 
by district courts to appellate precedent in a random sample of copyright 
and patent cases over an eight-year period.
128
 They found that “district 
courts treat the Federal Circuit as more authoritative (compared to the 
Supreme Court) on patent law than they treat the regional circuits 
(compared to the Supreme Court) on copyright law.”
129
 In addition, they 
found that “Federal Circuit[] precedent tends to be relied on more in pro-
patent opinions than in anti-patent opinions.”
130
 From these findings, 
Pekarek Krohn & Tiller conclude that “the Federal Circuit is succeeding 
in its purpose of providing a set of patent law that is more authoritative 




This Part first describes the research questions sought to be addressed 
through this empirical study of Federal Circuit appeals from district 
court decisions on permanent injunctions following eBay. It then 
explains the study design and collection process for the data and findings 
reported in this Article. Finally, it describes some limitations of the data 
collected. 
A. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
As previously mentioned, the objective of this study is to evaluate 
how the Federal Circuit applies eBay’s four-factor test in reviewing 
district court decisions regarding permanent injunctions in patent cases. 
In particular, it seeks to evaluate whether the Federal Circuit, as a 
specialized court with expertise in patent law, is more likely to favor 
prevailing patentees in awarding injunctive relief than generalized 
district courts. 
The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the Federal Circuit is 
more pro-injunction than the district courts in applying eBay. In other 
words, at the outset of this study, we expected that the Federal Circuit 
would affirm district court decisions that granted a permanent injunction 
to the patentee at a significantly higher rate than it affirmed district court 
decisions that denied an injunction. The basis for this hypothesis is that, 
                                                     
128. Krohn & Tiller, supra note 122, at 1186–88 (randomly sampling 109 copyright opinions and 
141 patent opinions from 2000–2007). 
129. Id. at 1179.  
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 1212.  
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as a specialized court intended to strengthen patent rights,
132
 the Federal 
Circuit is more likely to favor injunctions in lieu of monetary 
compensation than the generalist trial courts because an injunction 




Several secondary hypotheses were also formulated. First, we 
predicted that the majority of cases where the district court reached a 
decision on the merits of an injunction would be appealed to the Federal 
Circuit. This is because the cost of appeal in a patent case (consisting 
primarily of attorney’s fees) is substantially lower than the cost of 
litigating the case to judgment in the trial court.
134
 Second, we 
anticipated that there would be substantial variation among Federal 
Circuit judges regarding the application of injunctive relief after eBay 
based on concurring and dissenting opinions by individual judges in 
high-profile cases like Apple v. Motorola
135
 and Apple v. Samsung.
136
 
Third, we expected that opinions by Federal Circuit judges affirming 
injunctive relief would cite to Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion 
in eBay, which suggested that the “long tradition of equity practice” and 
“difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies” 
would warrant injunctive relief in most patent cases.
137
 In contrast, we 
expected that Federal Circuit opinions denying an injunction would cite 
to Justice Kennedy’s opinion, which offered several reasons why 
injunctive relief may not be warranted.
138
 
In addition, we sought to study several other aspects of appeals in 
patent cases that reached a merits decision on injunctive relief for which 
we did not have a clear hypothesis. For instance, we intended to evaluate 
whether appeal rates differed based on whether the trial court granted or 
denied a permanent injunction, as well as whether the case involved a 
PAE litigant. We also wanted to study the pendency of appellate 
decisions by the Federal Circuit, as well as whether a stay of injunctive 
                                                     
132. See supra section I.C.  
133. See Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing Patentees After eBay v. 
MercExchange, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 35 (2009) (explaining that the “inclination to automatically 
grant injunctions” prior to eBay “was in part motivated by an aversion to compulsory licensing, 
which was perceived to favor infringers over patentees”). 
134. See infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
135. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
136. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 809 F.3d 633, 662–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
137. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(emphasis omitted); see also supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
138. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra notes 57–63 and 
accompanying text. 
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relief was granted by either the district court or Federal Circuit. Finally, 
we were interested in other potential patterns regarding injunctive relief 
at the Federal Circuit. 
B. Study Design and Data Collection 
An original dataset was created for this study.
139
 The starting point 
was the dataset of post-eBay district court cases involving contested 
permanent injunctions decisions previously created by co-author 
Christopher Seaman.
140
 Using a variety of sources,
141
 Seaman’s study 
identified 218 district court decisions on permanent injunctions in patent 
cases from May 2006 through December 2013.
142
 These decisions were 
then hand-coded for a variety of criteria, including the identity of the 
parties, the district court that decided the injunction request, whether the 
injunction was granted or denied, and other basic case information.
143
 In 
addition, other information potentially relevant to the injunction 
decision, such as the type of patentee, the technological field of the 
asserted patent(s), and findings by the district court for each eBay factor 
were coded as well.
144
 All of this information was imported into the 
dataset created for this study. 
The current study hand-coded several categories of information 
regarding appeals for all patent cases included in Seaman’s district court 
dataset.
145
 The first category of variables coded involved the filing and 
pendency of any appeal to the Federal Circuit following the district 
court’s decision regarding the merits of a permanent injunction.
146
 This 
included whether a Notice of Appeal was filed by either party,
147
 the 
                                                     
139. The data collected for this study will be made publicly available upon the paper’s 
publication. See Robin Feldman, Mark A. Lemley, Jonathan S. Masur & Arti K. Rai, Open Letter on 
Ethical Norms in Intellectual Property Scholarship, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339, 348 (2016) 
(recommending that “data needed to replicate the results in a published empirical paper should be 
made accessible to other academics at the time the paper is published”). 
140. See generally Seaman, supra note 5. 
141. Id. at 1975–76 & nn.171–76 (explaining the search methodology used to identify cases for 
the district court dataset). 
142. See id. app. A at 2006–18 (listing the decisions included in the district court dataset). 
143. Id. at 1977 & nn.180–83. 
144. Id. at 1977–78 & nn.184–92. 
145. In addition, one recently-identified case that was not captured in the district court dataset, 
but met the criteria for inclusion, was added for this study. See Edwards Lifesciences AG v. 
CoreValve, Inc., No. 08-CV-00091, 2011 WL 446203 (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2011), aff’d on liability but 
denial of permanent injunction vacated and remanded, 699 F.3d 1305, 131416 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
146. Variable names are listed in brackets in the following footnotes. 
147. This was coded as a binary variable: [appeal]. 
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docket number assigned to the appeal at the Federal Circuit,
148
 the start 
and end dates of the appeal,
149
 the total time the appeal was pending 
before the Federal Circuit,
150




The second category of variables coded related to the Federal 
Circuit’s disposition of the appeal (if one was filed). This included 
whether the Federal Circuit issued a decision regarding the appeal,
152
 
whether the decision was a summary affirmance pursuant to Federal 
Circuit Rule 36,
153
 whether the decision involved a three-judge panel or 
was decided en banc,
154
 and citation information for the decision.
155
 The 
identity of the Federal Circuit judges who participated in each decision 
was coded as well.
156
 Finally, if an injunction was granted by the district 
court, the district court and Federal Circuit dockets were studied to 




Next, each decision by the Federal Circuit was studied to ascertain 
whether it involved a merits decision regarding the district court’s 
decision to grant or deny a permanent injunction.
158
 Not all merits 
decisions by the Federal Circuit reached the permanent injunction issue; 
                                                     
148. This was coded as a string variable: [cafcdocket]. If more than one party filed an appeal—a 
not uncommon situation—then only the lead docket number was coded. 
149. The start date of the appeal [appealstart] was coded based on the entry of the Notice of 
Appeal in the district court docket. The end date of the appeal [appealend] was based on either (1) 
the date the Federal Circuit issued its mandate or (2) the date the Federal Circuit’s mandate was 
entered in the district court’s docket (the latter was preferred when available). 
150. This was coded by calculating the difference in days between the start date of the appeal and 
the end date of the appeal and storing the result as a new variable: [appealdays].  
151. This was coded as a binary variable: [crossappeal]. 
152. This was coded as a binary variable: [cafcop_opinion]. 
153. See Fed. Cir. R. 36 (2016) (permitting the court to “enter a judgment of affirmance without 
opinion” in certain circumstances). This was coded as a binary variable: [cafcop_rule36].  
154. These were coded separately as binary variables: [panel_op] and [enbanc]. 
155. This was coded as a string variable: [appealcite]. 
156. The membership of each panel decision was coded in three variables, listed in the order that 
appears in the published decision or order: [judge1], [judge2], and [judge3]. All of the cases that 
reached a decision on the merits of injunctive relief were decided in three-judge panels; none were 
decided en banc. 
157. This information was coded as two separate binary variables, one for the district court’s 
decision on whether to grant a stay [dc_stay] and another for the Federal Circuit’s decision on 
whether to grant a stay [cafc_stay]. These were later combined into another variable that captured 
whether a stay was entered by either court [stay_all].  
158. This was coded as a binary variable: [merits_inj]. 
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indeed, most did not.
159
 This occurred, for example, when the Federal 
Circuit overturned the trial court or jury on an issued related to liability, 
such as claim construction, infringement, and/or an invalidity defense. In 
such cases, the Federal Circuit typically vacated the entry of an 
injunction if one had been granted without considering whether it should 
have been granted under eBay.
160
 Thus, a Federal Circuit decision was 
coded as involving a merits decision regarding a permanent injunction if 
either: (1) the Federal Circuit’s written opinion discussed and reached a 
substantive decision regarding the merits of the district court’s decision 
to grant or deny a permanent injunction under eBay; or (2) the district 
court had reached a merits decision regarding a permanent injunction 
under eBay, and the Federal Circuit issued a summary affirmance of the 
district court pursuant to Federal Circuit Rule 36. Using these criteria, a 




Finally, a number of additional variables were coded if the Federal 
Circuit issued a decision regarding the merits of the district court’s 
permanent injunction decision. These included whether the district 
court’s decision regarding the award of a permanent injunction was 
affirmed or not,
162
 whether the Federal Circuit’s decision cited to either 
Chief Justice Roberts’ or Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinions in 
eBay,
163
 whether the Federal Circuit’s decision discussed patents as 
                                                     
159. See infra section III.A.4 (noting that only 27% of decisions by the Federal Circuit reached 
the merits of the district court’s injunction decision). 
160. See, e.g., Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 609 F.3d 1364, 1371 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing the jury’s verdict of infringement and vacating the permanent injunction 
without discussing eBay); 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Securities, Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(same); Lexion Med., LLC v. Northgate Techs., Inc., 292 Fed. App’x 42 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (vacating 
and remanding judgment of infringement based on incorrect claim construction and vacating 
permanent injunction). One exception to this general practice occurred in Fresenius USA, Inc. v. 
Baxter International, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009), where the Federal Circuit concluded that 
“the district court performed the appropriate analysis required by eBay” and “the district court did 
not abuse its discretion when it granted permanent injunctive relief,” but ultimately vacated the 
injunction and remanded to the trial court “to revise or reconsider the injunction” in light of its 
reversal of the district court’s grant of judgment as matter of law on two patents-in-suit. Id. at 1302–
03. 
161. See infra section III.A.4. 
162. This was coded as a binary variable: [affirm]. Any merits decision regarding a permanent 
injunction that was anything other than an affirmance—including a reversal, a vacatur, or vacate-
and-remand—was coded as not affirmed. We also coded the disposition for each Federal Circuit 
decision regarding injunctive relief using the more detailed categories described in LEE EPSTEIN & 
ANDREW D. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH (2015), but the resulting 
data was too granular for useful data analysis given the small number of cases. 
163. These were coded as binary variables: [cafc_roberts_cite] and [cafcop_kennedy_cite]. 
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creating or conferring property rights on its owners (including the right 
to exclude others),
164
 whether the Federal Circuit’s decision discussed 
the fact that the patentee was a non-practicing entity,
165
 and the Federal 
Circuit’s conclusion regarding each eBay factor if one was reached.
166
 In 
addition, if a Federal Circuit judge issued a separate concurring or 
dissenting opinion regarding injunctive relief, a dummy variable was 
coded
167
 and a separate entry was created for this opinion.
168
 Finally, a 
text field was created for any particularly interesting or significant 





Before discussing the study’s findings, it is important to note several 
potential limitations of the data collected.
170
 First, patent litigation is 
often complex and frequently involves numerous issues, such as claim 
construction, infringement (direct and indirect), various grounds for 
invalidity, other defenses (such as inequitable conduct, exhaustion, 
laches, and prosecution history estoppel), and remedies.
171
 Moreover, the 
parties’ strategic objectives in litigation can vary as well.
172
 As a result, 
it can be “difficult to make generalizations about patent litigation from 
the study of individual cases.”
173
 
Second, this study is based primarily on litigated court decisions, 
which are subject to well-known selection effects. “[T]he selection effect 
                                                     
164. This was coded as a binary variable: [cafcop_prop_rights]. 
165. This was coded as a binary variable: [cafcop_discuss_npe]. 
166. These were coded as four separate binary variables: [cafcop_ebay_factor1], 
[cafcop_ebay_factor2], [cafcop_ebay_factor3], and [cafcop_ebay_factor4]. If the Federal Circuit 
did not discuss the merits of one or more eBay factors—for example, because it concluded that a 
permanent injunction was not warranted because the patentee could not demonstrate irreparable 
harm and thus reversed the district court on this factor alone—these values were left blank.   
167. This variable is: [separate_op]. 
168. To avoid confusion during data analysis, a dummy variable called [court] was created to 
represent whether the entry represented the decision of the Federal Circuit panel (either 
unanimously or by majority vote) (coded as 1) or whether the entry represented the separate opinion 
of an individual Federal Circuit judge (coded as 0). 
169. This was coded as a string variable: [notes]. 
170. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1187 (2011) (“All projects involving empirical studies of legal 
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refers to the proposition that the selection of tried cases is not a random 
sample of the mass of underlying cases.”
174
 This is because “[c]ases only 
go to trial when the parties substantially disagree on the predicted 
outcome.”
175
 Thus, when the applicable legal standard clearly favors one 
side, parties tend to settle their disputes rather than incur the expense of 
litigation, which can be considerable.
176
 As a result, “the disputes 




Here, the cases studied are not representative of all patent disputes, or 
even all patent infringement litigation, because each case must satisfy 
several requirements. First, the case must have reached a decision on the 
merits of the patentee’s claim of infringement. Like other forms of civil 
litigation, the vast majority of patent cases settle before a decision on the 
merits of the lawsuit are reached.
178
 Second, the patentee must have 
prevailed on liability (i.e., infringement and validity if raised as a 
defense), which occurs in a minority of all cases litigated to judgment.
179
 
Third, the prevailing patentee must seek a permanent injunction against 
future infringement
 
instead of monetary damages (such as an ongoing 
royalty).
180
 Fourth, the losing infringer must have opposed the entry of 
                                                     
174. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending 
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1129 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting Theodore 
Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 337, 337 (1990)). For the seminal article on the “selection effect,” see generally 
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(1984). 
175. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1129. 
176. The most recent edition of the AIPLA Report of the Economic Survey reports that median 
litigation costs exceed $5 million in patent infringement suits where more than $25 million is at 
stake. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, AIPLA 2015 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 37 
(2015). 
177. Priest & Klein, supra note 174, at 4. 
178. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of 
Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1780 (2014) (finding that greater than 90% of 
patent lawsuits filed in 2008 and 2009 settle or are otherwise resolved without a decision on the 
merits); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical 
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH U. L. REV. 237, 259 
(2006). 
179. See Allison, Lemley & Schwartz, supra note 178, at 1787–88, 1788 fig.5 (finding that 
patentees prevailed in only 26% of cases litigated to final judgment that were filed in 2008 and 
2009). 
180. Gupta & Kesan, supra note 91, at 8 fig.2 (finding that the filing of permanent injunction 
motions in patent cases decreased from 3.3% of all cases in 2000 to 0.6% in 2012). An increasing 
number of patentees have sought a court-ordered ongoing royalty in lieu of a permanent injunction 
against future infringement. See Christopher B. Seaman, Ongoing Royalties in Patent Cases After 
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 As a result, only a small fraction of patent cases filed 
during the relevant time period meet are included in the dataset.
182
 
Third, hand coding of appellate dockets and court decisions can 
introduce bias or error. For example, if the coding instructions are 
imprecise or include room for subjectivity, this could introduce errors 
and negatively impact reproducibility.
183
 However, this concern can be 
mitigated by creating, pilot-testing, and implementing written coding 
rules that all coders must follow, as was done in this study.
184
 Another 
potential concern is that court dockets in patent cases can be complicated 
and difficult to understand, particularly for law students without any 
prior experience in patent litigation.
185
 As a result, at least one co-
author—both of whom have substantial patent litigation experience prior 
to joining the academy
186
—reviewed all initial coding decisions made by 
student research assistants. When the reviewing co-author was uncertain 
how a coding issue should be resolved, both co-authors reviewed the 
issue and made a joint decision. 
Fourth, the dataset contains a relatively small number of Federal 
Circuit merits decisions regarding permanent injunctive relief. Although 
the authors collected information regarding appeals in nearly 200 patent 
cases, the Federal Circuit only reached a merits decision on the 
injunction issue in 42 of those cases. This results in relatively low 
                                                     
eBay: An Empirical Assessment and Proposed Framework, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 203, 21618 
(2015). 
181. See Seaman, supra note 5, at 1976 & n.174 (explaining why only contested injunction 
decisions were included in the district court dataset). 
182. Compare LEX MACHINA, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION YEAR IN REVIEW 1 (2014) (stating that 
over 25,000 patent cases were filed in the district courts from 20072014), with Seaman, supra note 
5, at 1976, app. A at 200719 (listing 218 injunction decisions in the district court dataset). 
183. Jason Rantanen, Empirical Analyses of Judicial Opinions: Methodology, Metrics and the 
Federal Circuit, 49 CONN. L. REV. 227 (2016). 
184. In empirical research, written coding instructions are preferred so that all coders apply the 
same criteria for each coding decision. This helps promote consistency in coding and serves as “a 
check against looking, consciously or not, for confirmation of predetermined positions.” Mark A. 
Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 
81 (2008); see also Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, Coding Variables, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
SOCIAL MEASUREMENT 321, 325 (Kimberly Kempf-Leonard ed., 2005) (explaining that “the 
overriding goal of a codebook is to minimize human judgment—to leave as little as possible to 
interpretation”). The authors’ written coding instructions will be made available upon request. 
185. See, e.g., Allison, Lemley & Schwartz, supra note 178, at 1774 (noting that coding of court 
dockets and outcomes “in patent cases[] is notoriously difficult and time consuming, requiring deep 
knowledge of patent law and litigation,” and therefore declining to use student coders). 
186. Professor Seaman worked on patent litigation matters between 2005 and 2009 with the law 
firm Sidley Austin LLP, and Professor Holte worked on patent litigation matters with the law firms 
Finnegan and Jones Day for over four years.  
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statistical power (although it represents the entire population of relevant 
appeals decisions during the study period).
187
 It also increases the 
possibility of a Type II error (i.e., false negative) in hypothesis testing.
188
 
As a result, some traditional statistical tools, such as maximum 
likelihood-based logistic regression analysis, were not employed.
189
 
Instead, a descriptive approach was taken for hypotheses related to the 
Federal Circuit’s reasoning for injunction decisions.
190
 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This Part presents the findings from analysis of the dataset and some 
implications of these findings for patent law and litigation, as well as 
innovation policy more generally.
191





1. Appeals Filed 
A threshold issue studied was how often one or more parties filed an 
appeal to the Federal Circuit. Since the bulk of litigation costs in patent 
cases occur at the trial court level,
193
 a high percentage of cases 
                                                     
187. See generally JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES (2d ed. 1988).  
188. See, e.g., CATHERINE S. TAYLOR, VALIDITY AND VALIDATION 70 (2013) (“Low statistical 
power occurs when the likelihood of Type II error is high, which can result from the use of a small 
sample size and/or when the true effect size is small.”).  
189. See generally Gary King & Langche Zeng, Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data, 9 POL. 
ANALYSIS 137 (Spring 2001) (explaining the problems associated with using logistic regression for 
rare events); see also Paul Allison, Logistic Regression for Rare Events, STAT. HORIZONS (Feb. 13, 
2012), https://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats3/RareEvents.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7MW-QX63] 
(“[The] maximum likelihood estimation of the logistic model is well known to suffer from small-
sample bias.”). Instead, a type of logistic regression for use with small sample sizes called exact 
logistic regression was employed instead. See infra section III.A.7. 
190. See infra sections III.A.8–9. 
191. We did not analyze the Federal Circuit’s discussion of individual eBay factors due to the 
small number of cases that reached a written decision on them. See supra note 161. 
192. Stata 14.1, STATA DATA ANALYSIS AND STAT. SOFTWARE, http://www.stata.com/news/14-
1/ [https://perma.cc/9HSP-8PZC]. 
193. See AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 176, at 37–40 (finding that litigation costs 
through end of discovery represented over half all litigation costs for patent cases involving $10 
million and greater at issue); Meredith Addy, Appellate Strategy Before the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, in PATENT LITIGATION, NEGOTIATION, AND SETTLEMENT (Aspatore ed., 
2006) (“Generally, once a patent case has gone through a district court trial, it has already cost, on 
average, $3 to $5 million, or more. Comparatively, the cost of appeal is far less . . . [and] almost 
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involving injunction decisions were expected to be appealed. This 
prediction turned out to be accurate; appeals were filed in 90% of cases 
in the dataset (198 of 219 cases), as depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1:  
Percentage of Cases Appealed to Federal Circuit 
 
This figure is consistent with prior studies, which also show that the 
vast majority of patent cases reaching a district court decision on the 
merits are appealed.
194
 Interestingly, cases where the district court 
denied an injunction were appealed at a slightly higher rate than cases 
where courts granted an injunction, as shown in Table 1 below. This 
difference was statistically significant.
195
 
                                                     
always exponentially less than the initial litigation. Furthermore, judgments in many patent trials are 
in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Hence, the loser, naturally, wants to appeal.”). 
194. See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2016 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 18 fig.22 
(2016), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2016-pwc-patent-litigation-
study.pdf [https://perma.cc/UV9P-HR7T] (stating that 80% of district court cases decided at trial 
between 2006 and 2013 were appealed to the Federal Circuit). 
195. p = 0.013 using Pearson’s chi-square test. 
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Table 1:  
Percentage of Cases Appealed to Federal Circuit:  
By District Court Injunction Decision 
 





(138 of 158 cases) 
98% 
(60 of 61 cases) 
 
Cases involving PAEs were also appealed to the Federal Circuit at a 
slightly higher rate than all other cases, as shown in Table 2 below. 




Table 2:  
Percentage of Cases Appealed to Federal Circuit: By PAE Status 
 
Appeal Filed Patentee Is PAE Patentee Not PAE 
100% 
(25 of 25 cases) 
89% 
(173 of 194 cases) 
 
Cross-appeals by the other party on one or more issues are relatively 
common as well.
197
 As illustrated in Figure 2 below, when an appeal was 
filed by one party, a cross-appeal was filed by the other party over 40% 
of the time (84 of 198 cases). Again, this result was generally consistent 
with other studies showing that a significant fraction, but less than a 
majority, of appeals in patent cases involved a cross-appeal as well.
198
 
                                                     
196. p = 0.084 using Pearson’s chi-square test. 
197. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3) (2016) (“If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other 
party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or 
within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later.”). 
198. See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, supra note 194, at 19 (showing that almost 
30% of patent cases tried on the merits are appealed by both parties). 
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Figure 2:  
Percentage of Cross-Appeals to Federal Circuit 
(Appealed Cases Only) 
 
 
In addition, cross-appeals were more likely to be filed in cases where 
the district court denied an injunction, as shown in Table 3 below. This 
difference was statistically significant.
199
 In most of these cases, the 
cross-appealing party—usually the prevailing patentee—contested the 
district court’s decision not to grant an injunction. 
 
Table 3:  
Percentage of Cross-Appeals to Federal Circuit: 









(47 of 138 cases) 
62% 
(37 of 60 cases) 
 
                                                     
199. p < 0.001 using Pearson’s chi-square test. 
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2. Stays of Injunctive Relief 
Another topic studied was the frequency of stays of permanent 
injunctions granted by courts. Ordinarily, a permanent injunction is 
effective upon issuance, preventing the infringer from making, using, 
selling, offering to sell, or importing any product that infringes the 
patent.
200
 However, a court may delay the injunction’s implementation 
by granting a stay. Stays may be granted by either the district court that 
issued the injunction or by the Federal Circuit upon motion.
201
 To obtain 
a stay, the moving party “must establish a strong likelihood of success 
on the merits, or, failing that . . . demonstrate a substantial case on the 
merits provided that the harm factors militate in its favor.”
202
 If granted, 
the stay preserves the status quo by not enforcing the injunction for 
either a fixed period of time or until the merits of the appeal are decided. 
Staying an injunction may help reduce the holdup problem associated 
with injunctions in patent cases.
203
 “[F]aced with the certainty of a court-
ordered injunction, an infringer likely will be willing to settle the suit by 
paying the patentee a higher price to practice the claimed invention,” 
often with the price increase passed along to consumers.
204
 But a stay 
may help mitigate this situation by granting the infringer a limited time 
period to implement a non-infringing design around with similar 
functionality, while continuing to offer the infringing product or 
service.
205
 The court may impose a royalty for infringing sales during the 
                                                     
200. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 271(a) (2012). 
201. See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c) (2016) (authorizing the district court to “suspend . . . an injunction 
on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights”); FED. R. APP. P. 8(a) 
(permitting a party to move for a stay of injunction pending appeal); Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 
F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[D]istrict courts possess broad equitable authority to modify 
injunctions. This broad authority, coupled with the wide discretion to manage the order in which 
they address issues pending before them, necessarily vests district courts with the authority to 
extend the stay of an injunction. . . .”). 
202. Aug. Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 395 F. App’x 692, 69293 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Hilton 
v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 778 (1987)). 
203. See infra note 286 and accompanying text. 
204. Tucker, supra note 2, at 1281. 
205. See, e.g., Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. C 03-1431 SBA, 2008 
WL 928496, at *3–4, *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2008) (delaying implementation of injunction by nine 
months to permit infringer to seek FDA approval for a design around); see also Lemley & Shapiro, 
supra note 90, at 203638. But see Vincenzo Denicolò et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief: 
Interpreting eBay in High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J. COMP. L. & 
ECON. 571, 596 (2008) (contending that if “stays of injunctions [are] routinely 
granted . . . this . . . policy would penalize the most valuable patents”). 
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 A stay may also be warranted when delaying 
implementation of the injunction would promote the public interest, such 




As illustrated in Figure 3, courts granted stays less than one-quarter of 
the time (24%, 38 of 158 cases) when the district court granted an 
injunction. This included cases where the court delayed the injunction’s 





Figure 3:  
Stays of Permanent Injunctions 
(Injunction Granted by District Court Only) 
 
                                                     
206. See, e.g., ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 641 
(E.D. Va. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 694 F.3d 1312, 1336–43 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (injunction 
vacated and remanded for entry of ongoing royalty). 
207. See, e.g., Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Interlace Med., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 2d 69, 80 (D. Mass. 
2013) (granting an injunction but staying its implementation pending appeal because “at least some 
doctors and their patients will suffer a negative impact if [the infringer] is enjoined from selling its 
medical device”); Nat’l Instruments Corp. v. Mathworks, Inc., No. 2:01-CV-11-TJW, 2003 WL 
24049230, at *7 (E.D. Tex. June 23, 2003) (staying an injunction for eighteen months because the 
infringing product was used by automobile and airline manufacturers “when engineering safety 
features for their products”). 
208. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1188 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 
(explaining that the district court denied a motion to stay the permanent injunction, but allowed 
continuing sales of infringing products pursuant to a mandatory royalty for a “sunset period” of 
thirteen months). 
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Of these cases, district courts granted a stay 28 times, the Federal 
Circuit granted a stay 7 times, and in 3 cases both the district court and 
the Federal Circuit concluded that a stay was warranted. Interestingly, 
courts granted a stay of injunctive relief 75% of the time when a PAE 




3. Appeal Pendency 
Data was also collected on the duration of appeals. During fiscal years 
2006–2015, the Federal Circuit reported a median time to disposition of 
11.6 months for appeals from district courts that terminated after a 
hearing (oral argument) or submission on the briefs.
210
 For the most 
recent fiscal year (2015), the Federal Circuit reported a slightly higher 
disposition time of 12.0 months for appeals from district courts.
211
 
The median time to disposition for appeals for all cases included in 
the dataset was 15.5 months. But this time varied substantially based on 
whether the Federal Circuit ultimately issued a merits decision on the 
appeal, either in a written opinion or through a Rule 36 summary 
affirmance.
212
 As illustrated in Table 4 below, in cases where no merits 
decision was issued—usually when the parties voluntarily dismissed the 
                                                     
209. p = 0.014 using Pearson’s chi-square; p = 0.04 using Fischer’s exact. Fischer’s exact 
provides a better statistical test when there are small sample sizes. See Jenny V. Freeman and 
Michael J. Campbell, The Analysis of Categorical Data: Fisher’s Exact Test, SCOPE (June 2007), 
http://www.shef.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.43998!/file/tutorial-9-fishers.pdf [https://perma.cc/29R7-
ZXNM]. 
210. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, MEDIAN TIME TO DISPOSITION IN CASES 
TERMINATED AFTER HEARING OR SUBMISSION (2015), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ 
files/Median%20Disposition%20Time%20for%20Cases%20Terminated%20after%20Hearing%20o
r%20Submission%20%28Detailed%20table%20of%20data%202006-2015%29.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/8ST6-YLFA]. The vast majority of appeals from district courts to the Federal Circuit involve 
patent claims. Compare U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, APPEALS FILED IN MAJOR 
ORIGINS (2015), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/appeals_filed 
_in_major_origins_10-year_06-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7YH-DA5W] (showing that between 600 
and 650 appeals from district courts were filed in FY15), with U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
FED. CIRCUIT, FILINGS OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT APPEALS FROM THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 
(2015), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Caseload%20Patent%20Infringement%20% 
282006-2015%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/XH2P-ZU87]. 
211. MEDIAN TIME TO DISPOSITION IN CASES TERMINATED AFTER HEARING OR SUBMISSION, 
supra note 210; see also GIBSON DUNN, FEDERAL CIRCUIT YEAR IN REVIEW FOR 2013 – 2014 3 & 5, 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Federal-Circuit-2013-2014-Year-in-Review 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK2F-KUJL] (finding that average time from docketing to decision in district 
court patent appeals was fourteen months for precedential cases, and the time from district court 
decision to issuance of a Federal Circuit decision was seventeen months). 
212. See FED. CIR. R. 36 (permitting the court to “enter a judgment of affirmance without 
opinion” in certain circumstances). 
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appeal pursuant to a settlement
213
—the median time to disposition was 
9.6 months. In contrast, in cases involving a merits decision, the median 
time to disposition (as measured by date of issuance of the Federal 
Circuit’s mandate) was 16.2 months. 
 
Table 4:  




Federal Circuit:  
No Merits Decision 
Federal Circuit:  
Merits Decision 
9.6 months  16.2 months 
 
Table 5 below reports the mean (average) duration of appeals for 
cases in the dataset. The mean duration for all cases was 16.2 months. 
Cases involving no merits decisions terminated in a mean time of 12.0 
months, while cases involving a merits decision were disposed of in 17.3 





Table 5:  




Federal Circuit:  
No Merits Decision 
Federal Circuit:  
Merits Decision 
12.0 months 17.3 months 
 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of appeal pendency for all cases in the 
dataset where appeals were filed. It shows that the vast majority of 
appeals are resolved in less than 800 days (slightly over two years). 
 
                                                     
213. See FED. CIR. R. 42(b). 
214. See, e.g., Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 498 F. App’x 986 
(Fed. Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated sub nom., 500 F. App’x 951 (Fed. Cir. 
2013), and on reh’g en banc, 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. granted, judgment vacated and 
remanded sub nom., Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Universal Lighting Techs., Inc., __ U.S. __, 
135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 723 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013), 
vacated, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015); Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (infringer filed bankruptcy during Federal Circuit appeal, resulting in stay of 
case).  
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Figure 4:  
Appeal Pendency: Distribution 
 
4. Disposition of Appeal 
The dataset also contains information regarding how often appeals of 
patent cases that decided an injunction resulted in a merits decision on 
appeal. Not all appeals result in a merits decision; some cases may be 
appealed and later settled by the parties prior to a ruling. For example, a 
losing party may file an appeal even though it believes it will likely be 
unsuccessful in overturning the decision, hoping to negotiate a discount 
(“haircut”) on the monetary judgment.
215
 
Figure 5 below shows that most appeals for cases in the dataset result 
in a decision on the merits on at least one issue (79%, 156 of 198 cases). 
Only 21% of cases (42 of 198 cases) settled or were procedurally 
dismissed prior to a merits decision by the Federal Circuit. Of the 
appeals that did not settle or get dismissed, the Federal Circuit issued a 
written opinion in the vast majority (89%, 139 of 157 cases), while the 
remainder (11%, 17 of 156 cases) were decided by a Rule 36 summary 
affirmance. 
 
                                                     
215. See J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement, 91 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 59, 94 n.132 (2016) (noting that “[a] plaintiff often agrees to a haircut after the 
verdict in order to avoid appeals”). 
09 - Holte Seaman.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/5/2017  2:20 PM 
186 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:145 
 
Figure 5:  
Disposition of Appeal (Any Issue) 
 
 
The authors reviewed all cases appealed to the Federal Circuit that 
resulted in a decision on the merits and classified 42 of them 
(representing 27% of all merits decisions) as involving a decision 
regarding the merits of the district court’s decision on a permanent 
injunction. This included 25 cases where the Federal Circuit issued a 
written opinion and all 17 cases where the Federal Circuit issued a Rule 
36 summary affirmance. 
5. Affirmance Rates for Permanent Injunction Decisions 
A central issue in this study is how often the Federal Circuit affirmed 
district court decisions granting and denying a permanent injunction 
post-eBay.
216
 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviews the district court’s 
                                                     
216. We initially hoped to compare the reversal rate by the Federal Circuit for injunction 
decisions to prior empirical studies that evaluated reversal rates in Federal Circuit decisions more 
generally. See Moore, supra note 123, at 397 (finding a reversal rate of 22% in patent cases 
appealed to the Federal Circuit from district court judgments in 19931998); Field, supra note 123, 
at 759 (finding a 25% reversal rate by the Federal Circuit in patent cases for issues reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard); Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 
Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 1161, 1174–75 (2010) (finding a 21% reversal rate by the Federal Circuit for all 
appealed issues from 20002007). However, in numerous cases, when the Federal Circuit decided 
not to affirm the district court on its injunction decision—particularly when the district court denied 
an injunction—the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded to the trial court, rather than granting a 
reversal. See, e.g., WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (vacating 
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decision regarding a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion,
217
 a 
deferential standard of review.
218
 An abuse of discretion exists when the 
trial court “made a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors 




For cases involving a merits decision on injunctive relief, there was a 
sharp split in affirmance rates by the Federal Circuit depending on 
whether the district court granted or denied injunctive relief to the 
prevailing patent owner. As shown in Figure 6, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision to grant a permanent injunction 
88% of the time (22 of 25 cases),
220
 while it affirmed the district court’s 
decision to deny injunctive relief only slightly over half of the time 




                                                     
permanent injunction and remanding to “the district court to conduct a more thorough analysis of 
the eBay factors”); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 136873 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(vacating the district court’s finding that the patentee could not establish irreparable harm and 
remanding); Whitserve LLC v. Comput. Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 3536 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(vacating the district court’s denial of an injunction and remanding to district court “to address the 
propriety of prospective relief”); Presidio Components v. American Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 
1351, 136264 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that “the district court clearly erred in finding no 
irreparable injury,” “vacat[ing] the district court’s denial of [patentee’s] motion for a permanent 
injunction and remand[ing] for a re-weighing of the four [eBay] factors”). As a result, we could not 
make an apples-to-apples comparison to reversal rates in these prior studies.  
217. See, e.g., Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing 
Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
218. See, e.g., Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(noting that “[a]buse of discretion is a deferential standard of review”); see also Jonathan S. Masur 
& Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 655 (“Appellate courts 
also apply deferential review to many decisions that involve legal judgments of possible future 
relevance, including . . . injunctions. . . .”). 
219. Innogenetics, 512 F.3d at 1379 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
220. The cases that are counted as affirmance on the merits of injunctive relief includes Fresenius 
USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288 (2009), where the Federal Circuit held that “[t]he 
district court performed the appropriate analysis required by eBay” and concluded “that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion when it granted permanent injunctive relief.” Id. at 130203. 
Despite this, the Federal Circuit vacated the injunction and remanded for reconsideration in light of 
the fact that it reversed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law regarding two of the 
patents-in-suit. Id. at 1303. As a result, the authors coded the cases as affirming the district court’s 
conclusion that a permanent injunction was appropriate. Even if this case is counted as a non-
affirmance, however, the difference in affirmance rates is still statistically significant under both 
Pearson’s chi-square test and Fisher’s exact test. 
221. p = 0.011 using Pearson’s chi-square test; p = 0.015 using one-tailed Fisher’s exact test. 
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Figure 6:  
Affirmance Rates - Permanent Injunction Decisions 
(All Merits Decisions) 
 
 
In addition, there is a similar difference in affirmance rates between 
cases where the district court granted and denied an injunction if 
summary affirmances under Rule 36 are excluded (i.e., only written 
decisions by the Federal Circuit are considered), as illustrated in Figure 
7. For this subset of decisions, the Federal Circuit affirmed 77% of the 
time when the district court granted a permanent injunction (10 of 13 
cases), compared to only 33% of the time when the district court denied 
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Figure 7:  
Affirmance Rates - Permanent Injunction Decisions 
(Excluding Rule 36 Summary Affirmances) 
 
6. Injunction Decisions by Federal Circuit Judge 
The study also coded all cases in the dataset for each Federal Circuit 
judge’s decision regarding the merits of injunctive relief. This was done 
to evaluate whether there were significant variations between members 
of that court in reviewing injunction decisions. 
A new variable was created to determine how often each Federal 
Circuit judge was “pro-injunction.”
223
 A judge’s decision on the merits 
of an injunction was classified as pro-injunction if either: (1) the judge 
voted to affirm the lower court’s grant of a permanent injunction; or (2) 
the judge voted to not affirm (i.e., reverse, vacate, and/or remand) the 
lower court’s denial of a permanent injunction. In contrast, a judge’s 
decision was classified as “anti-injunction” if either: (1) the judge voted 
to affirm the lower court’s denial of a permanent injunction; or (2) the 
judge voted to not affirm (i.e., reverse, vacate, and/or remand) the lower 
court’s grant of a permanent injunction. If a judge’s decision differed 
from the panel opinion—for example, by dissenting from the affirmance 
of the denial of an injunction—then the judge was coded separately. 
Rule 36 summary affirmances were included in this coding. 
                                                     
223. This variable is labeled in the dataset as [proinjunction]. 
77% 
33% 
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Table 6 below shows the pro-injunction rates for all Federal Circuit 
judges who were active members of the court at some time between 
2006 and 2015 and had at least five merits decisions on injunctive relief 
in the dataset.
224
 It also shows the number of separate opinions (i.e., 
concurrences and dissents) authored by each judge regarding the 
propriety of injunctive relief; these opinions indicate areas of 
disagreement with the other members of the panel. 
 
Table 6:  




N Separate  
Opinions 
Rader 100% 10 1 
O’Malley 89% 9 0 
Gajarsa 83% 12 0 
Prost 80% 15 3 
Dyk 75% 8 0 
Average: 71% 
Lourie 71% 7 0 
Mayer 71% 7 1 
Newman 70% 10 0 
Reyna 60% 5 0 
Moore 55% 11 0 
Linn 50% 6 0 
Bryson 43% 7 1 
 
Given the small number of merits decisions per judge, it is not 
surprising that no Federal Circuit judge varied from the rest of the 
court’s membership in a statistically significant way regarding injunctive 
relief. The only judge who unanimously ruled in favor of injunctive 
relief was former Chief Judge Randall Rader (10 for 10 decisions).
225
 As 
                                                     
224. Excluded from Table 6 are Judges Chen (1 decision), Clevenger (2 decisions), Friedman (1 
decision), Hughes (0 decisions), Michel (2 decisions), Plager (2 decisions), Schall (2 decisions), 
Stoll (0 decisions), Taranto (1 decision), and Wallach (4 decisions). Also excluded are district court 
judges who sat by designation as a member of the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292 (2012); they 
are collectively classified in the dataset as Other (4 decisions).  
225. Chief Judge Rader had a statistically significant difference from the rest of the Federal 
Circuit using a simple multiple comparison test. p = 0.035 using Pearson’s chi-square; p = 0.034 for 
Fisher’s exact. However, this result was not significant after imposing a multiple testing penalty 
(Bonferroni correction). See MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 
211 (2d ed. 2011). 
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explained in more detail below, Judge Rader’s pro-injunction decisions 
are consistent with his characterization of patents as conferring a 
property-like right to exclude on their owners.
226
 
7. Regression Analysis 
As previously described, normal (maximum likelihood) logistic 
regression analysis of the Federal Circuit’s merits decisions regarding 
injunctive relief was not feasible due to the relatively small number of 
such decisions in the dataset.
227
 Instead, an alternative methodology 




Three different models were construed for this analysis.
229
 In all three 
models, the Federal Circuit’s affirmance of the district court was the 
dependent variable.
230
 The first model (Model #1) used three 
independent variables: whether the district court had granted or denied 
an injunction;
231
 whether the patentee was a PAE;
232
 and whether the 
patentee and infringer were competitors in a product market.
233
 The 
latter two variables were imported from Christopher Seaman’s prior 
study of district court decisions, which found that both were correlated 
with injunction decisions at the district court level.
234
 The second model 
(Model #2) added two more variables based on the field of technology of 
the asserted patent: whether the patent involved software or computer 
                                                     
226. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.  
227. See supra note 189 and sources cited therein. 
228. See Cyrus R. Mehta & Nitin R. Patel, Exact Logistic Regression: Theory and Examples, in 
14 STAT. IN MED. 2143 (1995) (describing the underlying theory for exact conditional inference). 
229. These models did not include judge assignment as a control variable because Federal Circuit 
judges are assigned to a representative cross-section of cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2012) 
(authorizing the Federal Circuit to “determine by rule a procedure for the rotation of judges from 
panel to panel to ensure that all of the judges sit on a representative cross section of the cases 
heard”); Fed. Cir. R. 47.2(b) (“Assignment of cases to panels will be made so as to provide each 
judge with a representative cross-section of the fields of law within the jurisdiction of the court.”). 
Cf. Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignments in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2015) (finding evidence of non-randomness in 
panel assignments in some federal circuits, but not studying the Federal Circuit). 
230. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (describing [affirm]). 
231. See Seaman, supra note 5, at 1977 n.182 (describing [injunction]). 
232. See id. at 1988 n.243 (describing [pae]). 
233. See id. at 1978 n.189 (2016) (describing [compete]). 
234. See id. at 1988 fig.3, 1990 fig.4, 199698 tbl.3. 
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 and whether the patent involved a medical device.
236
 The 
third model (Model #3) added one more variable: whether the district 
court that decided the permanent injunction motion in the first instance 
was the Eastern District of Texas,
237
 the district with the largest number 
of new patent cases filed each year and a preferred forum for PAEs.
238
 
The results of these three models are reported in Table 7 below. For 
each independent variable, the odds ratio—which is a measure of the 
strength of association between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable
239
—is reported, along with the 95% confidence 
interval in parentheses. An asterisk indicates statistical significance 
(p < 0.05) for a variable. Finally, the model score reported by Stata is 
reported in the final row.
240
 
                                                     
235. This was coded as a dummy (binary) variable: [software_electronics]. The “computer 
software” and “electronics” technology categories from Seaman’s district court study were 
combined to code for this variable. See id. at 1977 n.185. 
236. This was coded as a dummy (binary) variable: [medicaldevice]. The “medical device” 
technology category from Seaman’s district court study was used to code for this variable. See id. 
237. This was coded as a dummy (binary) variable: [txed]. This information was derived from the 
[district] variable in Seaman’s district court study. See id. at 1977 n.181. 
238. See Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 268 (2016) 
(“Notably, the Eastern District of Texas is especially popular with patent assertion entities . . . .”); 
Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the 
Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 193, 
214 (2007) (finding that patent trolls “have shown a clear preference for the Eastern District [of 
Texas] over other venues”); Mark Liang, The Aftermath of TS Tech: The End of Forum Shopping in 
Patent Litigation and Implications for Non-Practicing Entities, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 29, 42–
43 tbl.1 (2010) (listing the Eastern District of Texas as the top forum for infringement suits by non-
practicing entities). 
239. Odds ratios of greater than 1 indicate that the variable has a positive association with entry 
of a permanent injunction, while odds ratios of less than 1 indicate the variable has a negative 
relationship with entry of a permanent injunction. The amount by which the odds ratio is more or 
less than 1 reveals the magnitude of the association between the independent variable and the 
injunction decision. All odds ratios are reported to two decimal places. See FAQ: How Do I 
Interpret Odds Ratios in Logistic Regression?, UCLA INST. FOR DIGITAL RESEARCH AND EDUC., 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/odds_ratio.htm [https://perma.cc/B7G5-74RT]. 
240. The test of the overall model is a chi-square score, called “model score.” See Stata Data 
Analysis Examples, UCLA INST. FOR DIGITAL RESEARCH AND EDUC., 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/dae/exlogit.htm [https://perma.cc/J8TQ-GH7Z]. Higher values 
indicate better goodness-of-fit. 
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Table 7:  
Exact Logistic Regression 
 
Variable  Odds Ratio 
(95% Confidence Interval) 
Model #1 Model #2 Model #3 
injunction 6.58* 
(1.14 – 51.78) 
8.57* 
(1.38 – 74.27) 
7.59* 
(1.20 – 66.37) 
pae .79 
(.03 – 72.9) 
1.09 
(.03 – 121.49) 
.79 
(.01 – 112.18) 
compete .94 
(.02 – 6.4) 
.46 
(.02 – 6.48) 
.38 




(.12 – 14.47) 
1.16 
(.11 – 13.57) 
medicaldevice - 6.11 
(.44 – 398.74) 
4.58 




(.09 – +∞) 
[median unbiased 
estimate] 
Model Score 6.62 9.36 10.29 
 
In all three models, the district court’s decision whether to grant a 
permanent injunction is positively correlated with the Federal Circuit’s 
decision whether to affirm the lower court’s decision on this issue, and 
this correlation is statistically significant.
241
 None of the other variables 
have a statistically significant relationship with Federal Circuit 
injunction decisions, a result that was surprising in light of the prior 
district court study. 
8. Content Analysis of Federal Circuit Injunction Decisions 
To further investigate the Federal Circuit’s behavior for its decisions 
regarding injunctive relief, we engaged in content analysis of the written 
Federal Circuit opinions in the dataset that reached a merits decision on 
a permanent injunction.
242
 This content analysis focused on two things: 
(1) discussion by the court regarding patents as conferring a property-
                                                     
241. Model #1: p = 0.032; Model #2: p = 0.016; Model #3: p = 0.027. 
242. See generally Hall & Wright, supra note 184 (explaining content analysis of judicial 
opinions as a form of empirical legal research). 
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based right to exclude on their owners; and (2) citations to Chief Justice 
Roberts’ and Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinions in eBay. 
As previously discussed, based on prior studies, the authors 
hypothesized that Federal Circuit opinions favoring injunctive relief 
would tend to cite Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence in eBay, while 
opinions that disfavored injunctive relief would cite Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence instead.
243
 In addition, opinions favoring injunctive relief 
were anticipated to refer to patents as property rights that conferred a 
right to exclude on their owners.
244
 
After coding, seven Federal Circuit opinions in the dataset were found 
to discuss patents as conferring a property right,
245
 three of which also 
cited Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence in eBay.
246
 In all of these 
opinions, the Federal Circuit reached a pro-injunction outcome—
namely, it either affirmed the district court’s grant of a permanent 
injunction,
247
 or it overturned a district court’s denial of a permanent 
injunction.
248
 Interestingly, four of these opinions emphasizing patents 
as creating property rights were authored by former Chief Judge 
Rader.
249
 In addition, current Chief Judge Prost authored opinions in two 
of these cases that appeared to disagree with the notion that patents 
                                                     
243. See Holte, supra note 9, at 721 (“In reviewing post-eBay injunction cases, many other 
scholars have concluded ‘a review of post-eBay federal district court decisions shows that though it 
is not the opinion of the Court, [Justice] Kennedy’s concurrence has proven to be highly 
persuasive.’” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); supra notes 13738. 
244. See supra note 137. 
245. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Broadcom Corp. v. 
Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 1325, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers 
Products Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. 
Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Edwards Lifesciences AG v. CoreValve, 
Inc., 699 F.3d 1305, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 
1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
246. Broadcom, 732 F.3d at 1338; Presidio Components, 702 F.3d at 1362; Robert Bosch, 659 
F.3d at 1149. There was also a fourth opinion citing Chief Justice Roberts, but only in a footnote 
discussing the district court’s likely reasoning. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 
F.3d 1288, 1302 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Read in context, the ‘all but inevitable’ statement does not 
amount to legal error, particularly in light of the fact that the district court applied the correct four-
factor test and explained its analysis. The district court was likely merely acknowledging, as did 
Chief Justice Roberts in eBay, that ‘courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of 
infringement in the vast majority of patent cases.’” (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 
U.S. 388, 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring))). 
247. Broadcom, 732 F.3d at 1338; Acumed, 551 F.3d at 1327–31. 
248. Apple, 735 F.3d at 1363; Douglas Dynamics, 717 F.3d at 1345; Presidio Components, 702 
F.3d at 1362–63; Edwards Lifesciences, 699 F.3d at 1314–16; Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1149. 
249. Broadcom, 732 F.3d 1325; Douglas Dynamics, 717 F.3d 1336; Presidio Components, 702 
F.3d 1351; Edwards Lifesciences, 699 F.3d 1305. 
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generally confer the right to exclude through an injunction.
250
 As a 
result, there appears to be differing views among some members of the 




Only two Federal Circuit merits opinions on injunctive relief cited to 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in eBay, and contrary to 
expectations, both of these decisions reached a pro-injunction outcome. 
In one of these cases, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court 
abused its discretion in holding that the patentee did not satisfy the first 
two eBay factors.
252
 In the second case, the court reversed the district 
court’s denial of a permanent injunction, citing to Kennedy’s opinion 
only to distinguish the facts of that case from situations where Justice 
Kennedy suggested that injunctive relief might be inappropriate.
253
 This 
                                                     
250. See Apple, 735 F.3d at 1363 (“Apple argues that . . . the plaintiff has a ‘property right 
granting the plaintiff the right to exclude’ . . . However, as the Supreme Court made clear in eBay, 
‘the creation of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that right.’”); 
Edwards Lifesciences, 699 F.3d at 1316–17 (Prost, J., concurring) (“To the extent that one reads this 
statement as creating the presumption of an injunction once the plaintiff prevails, which must be 
rebutted by the defendant, that is not the law . . . eBay made clear that there is no general rule that a 
successful plaintiff is entitled to an injunction; rather, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 
the four equitable factors that weigh in its favor in order to obtain a permanent injunction. We 
should take care to avoid possible misinterpretation of an otherwise clear Supreme Court 
standard.”); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 809 F.3d 633, 662–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Prost, 
C.J., dissenting) (dissenting from the majority’s conclusion that an injunction should issue, citing 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay and stating “[f]or the same reason, the statutory right to 
exclude should not categorically bias the public interest factor ‘strongly’ in the determination of the 
injunctive remedies as the majority asserts.” (emphasis in original)). 
251. This conclusion has also been noted by other scholars. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and 
Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1111–
12 (2003) (“These statistical and doctrinal shifts, coupled with scattered commentary from 
particular Federal Circuit judges, suggest that at least some members of the Federal Circuit view 
patents rights as a relatively unalloyed good, comparable to rights in tangible property.”).  
252. See Apple, 735 F.3d at 1372–73 (“Apple’s requested injunction relative to the scope of the 
patented features and the prospect that an injunction would have the effect of depriving the public of 
access to a large number of non-infringing features.” (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 
547 U.S. 388, 395 (Kennedy, J., concurring))). 
253. The Federal Circuit reasoned in Robert Bosch as follows: 
Although eBay abolishes our general rule that an injunction normally will issue when a patent 
is found to have been valid and infringed . . . it does not follow that courts should entirely 
ignore the fundamental nature of patents as property rights granting the owner the right to 
exclude. Indeed, this right has its roots in the Constitution, as the Intellectual Property Clause 
of the Constitution itself refers to inventors’ “exclusive Right to their 
respective . . . [d]iscoveries. . . .” “Discretion is not whim, and limiting discretion according to 
legal standards helps promote the basic principle of justice that like cases should be decided 
alike.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. at 395 (2006) (Roberts, J., concurring) 
(quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139, 126 S.Ct. 704, 163 L.Ed.2d 547 
(2005)). In this area, as others, “a page of history is worth a volume of logic” when “it comes 
to discerning and applying those standards.” Id. (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 
U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.)). This wisdom is particularly apt in traditional cases, such as 
this, where the patentee and adjudged infringer both practice the patented technology. See id. at 
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is in clear contrast to the impact Justice Kennedy’s concurrence has had 
in district courts, where it has been frequently cited to deny injunctive 
relief, particularly in cases involving PAEs.
254
 
9. Minority Case Details 
Finally, in light of the small number of cases where a district court’s 
denial of an injunction was affirmed by the Federal Circuit,
255
 or, even 
more scarce, where a district court’s grant of an injunction was not 
affirmed,
256
 descriptive detail on these cases may shed some additional 
light on instances where the Federal Circuit concludes that injunctive 
relief is not appropriate. 
For the nine cases since eBay where the Federal Circuit affirmed a 
district court injunction denial, an important first observation is that four 
of these cases concern medical device technology.
257
 Of the five non-
medical device cases, three were Rule 36 summary affirmances,
258
 and 
one case concerned a unique cross-appeal between Apple and 
Motorola.
259
 There, the court (with two separate opinions) reversed the 
denial of an injunction to Apple while affirming the injunction denial as 
                                                     
396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (contrasting the relevant considerations in traditional patent 
infringement actions with certain cases arising now “in which firms use patents not as a basis 
for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees,” “[w]hen 
the patented invention is but a small component of the product,” and those involving “the 
burgeoning number of patents over business methods”). 
659 F.3d at 1149–50 (citations in original) (internal citation omitted). 
254. See Holte, supra note 9, at 721–22 (discussing the reliance by many district courts on Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in eBay and its general disapproval of PAEs). 
255. The Federal Circuit affirmed injunction denials in nine cases: Hypoxico Inc. v. Colorado 
Altitude Training LLC, 608 F. App’x 946 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 
1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Motorola as patentee); Tyco Healthcare Group LP v. Applied Med. 
Resources Corp., 579 F. App’x 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Valeant Int’l Bermuda v. Actavis, Inc., 534 
F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 
F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Emcore Corp. v. Optium Corp., 408 F. App’x 355 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 
Cygnus Telecomms. Tech., LLC v. Worldport Commc’ns, Inc., 302 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
256. The Federal Circuit reversed district court injunction grants in three cases: ActiveVideo 
Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Innogenetics, N.V. v. 
Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008); MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels, Inc., 258 F. App’x 
318 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
257. Hypoxico, 608 F. App’x 946; Tyco Healthcare, 579 F. App’x 1005; Bard, 670 F.3d 1171; 
Voda, 536 F.3d 1311. 
258. Valeant, 534 F. App’x 999; Emcore, 408 F. App’x 355; Cygnus Telecomms., 302 F. App’x 
921. 
259. Apple, 757 F.3d 1286. 
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to Motorola’s FRAND-pledged patents.
260
 The final case concerned a 
procedural challenge after an injunction was originally granted by the 
district court and affirmed by the Federal Circuit pre-eBay, but the 
injunction was later dissolved by the district court after eBay.
261
 
                                                     
260. At the district court, Apple filed a complaint against Motorola for infringement of three 
patents, and Motorola counterclaimed, alleging that Apple infringed six of Motorola’s own patents. 
Id. at 1294. The district court, based largely on its claim construction decisions, granted summary 
judgment that neither party was entitled to damages or an injunction and dismissed all claims with 
prejudice before trial. Id. On appeal, the parties contested the district court’s claim construction, 
admissibility, damages, and injunction decisions for three Apple and three Motorola patents. Id. The 
Federal Circuit affirmed a majority of the district court’s claim construction decisions with the 
exception of certain “heuristic” claim limitations, id. at 1294–1313, and reversed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgement of no damages for infringement of Apple’s patents. Id. at 1313–22, 
1327–30. Based on its reversal of the district court’s construction of the “heuristic” limitations, the 
court also vacated the grant of summary judgment denying Apple’s request for an injunction. Id. at 
1330–31. 
Regarding Motorola’s claims, the court affirmed the district court’s decision that Motorola was 
not entitled to an injunction for infringement of its FRAND (fair, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory) committed patent. Id. at 1331–32. The court noted, however, that to the extent 
the district court applied a per se rule that injunctions are unavailable for any standard-essential 
patents, it erred, explaining that it saw no reason to create a separate rule or analytical framework 
for addressing injunctions for FRAND-committed patents. Id. Rather, the court held that “[t]he 
framework laid out by the Supreme Court in eBay, as interpreted by subsequent decisions of this 
court, provides ample strength and flexibility for addressing the unique aspects of FRAND 
committed patents and industry standards in general.” Id. at 1332. 
Chief Judge Rader dissented as to the portion of the court’s opinion affirming the district court’s 
denial of Motorola’s request for an injunction finding that the district court did not develop the facts 
necessary to apply eBay as it should have and, thus, the case should be remanded. Id. at 1332–34 
(Rader, C.J., dissenting in part). Judge Prost dissented with respect to the majority’s decision to 
vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment regarding Apple’s request for an injunction. 
Judge Prost agreed with the district court that Apple could not show that Motorola’s infringement 
caused it irreparable harm and, thus, would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment of 
no injunctive relief. Id. at 1340–42 (Prost, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The judge 
also agreed with the panel decision that Motorola should not receive an injunction. Id. at 1342–43. 
261. This appeal involved an original district court injunction-grant that was previously affirmed 
by the Federal Circuit. Amado, 517 F.3d at 1356 (citing Amado v. Microsoft Corp, 185 F. App’x 
953 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). After remand from the first appeal, the district court dissolved the injunction 
in light of the Court’s recent decision in eBay. Id. at 1359. Appealing this order, the patentee argued  
that because the eBay decision was handed down before [the Federal Circuit] decision in 
Amado I, albeit after the completion of briefing, and because the permanent injunction was 
included within [the Federal Circuit] mandate in Amado I, the mandate rule foreclosed 
Microsoft from challenging the injunction or the district court from modifying it. 
Id. Microsoft argued that “the propriety of the permanent injunction was not at issue in the first 
appeal, and thus was outside the scope of the [Federal Circuit’s] mandate. Alternatively, it argue[d] 
that eBay is an intervening decision and is thus an exception to the mandate rule.” Id.  
The Federal Circuit held that “the district court was well within its discretion in this case to 
reconsider the prospective application of the permanent injunction on remand in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay.” Id. at 1361. It also concluded that “the district court’s ultimate 
decision to dissolve the injunction was not an abuse of discretion, when, after applying the 
traditional four-factor test, it determined that an injunction was no longer equitable under the 
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Turning to the four medical device cases where the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s denial of an injunction, two of the four were 
Rule 36 summary affirmances.
262
 Of the remaining two cases, both 
opinions were authored by Judge Gajarsa. One opinion held that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in relying heavily on the public 
interest eBay factor to deny injunctive relief,
263
 and the second 
concluded that “[n]othing in eBay eliminates the requirement that the 
party seeking a permanent injunction must show that ‘it has suffered an 
irreparable injury.’”
264
 Accordingly, “monetary damages were adequate 
to compensate [the patentee.]”
265
 
Finally, reviewing the cases where the Federal Circuit did not affirm a 
district court injunction grant, all three opinions were authored by Judge 
Moore.
266
 In MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Labels,
267
 the court concluded that 
“the district court’s injunction is overly broad and therefore an abuse of 
discretion” and reversed.
268
 In Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs,
269
 the 
court went through a lengthy discussion regarding the jury’s reasonable 
royalty calculation and found error with the district court issuing an 
injunction after the patentee had already been awarded damages that 
included future sales; accordingly, the injunction grant was reversed.
270
 
Finally, in ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.,
271
 the 
                                                     
circumstances.” Id. While the Federal Circuit did not analyze any of the eBay factors in the opinion, 
due to the court’s language that “the district court’s ultimate decision to dissolve the injunction was 
not an abuse of discretion,” id., the authors determined that this case should be categorized as an 
affirmance of an injunction denial.  
262. Hypoxico, 608 F. App’x 946; Tyco Healthcare, 579 F. App’x 1005. 
263. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
264. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006)). 
265. Id.  
266. ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008); MPT, Inc. v. 
Marathon Labels, Inc., 258 F. App’x 318, 319 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
267. 258 F. App’x 318 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
268. Id. at 320. 
269. 512 F.3d 1363, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
270. Id. at 1380 (“The reasonable royalties awarded to Innogenetics include an upfront entry fee 
that contemplates or is based upon future sales by Abbott in a long term market. When a patentee 
requests and receives such compensation, it cannot be heard to complain that it will be irreparably 
harmed by future sales. Moreover, this factor greatly outweighs the other eBay factors in this case. 
As a result, the district court’s grant of an injunction prohibiting future sales of Abbott’s genotyping 
assay kits was an abuse of discretion and must be vacated.”). 
271. 694 F.3d 1312, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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court held that the district court clearly erred in finding for the patentee 




This study’s findings have several implications for both participants and 
policy makers in the patent system. The most important finding is that the 
Federal Circuit appears to be more favorable to patentees than the trial 
courts when it comes to awarding injunctive relief. Patentees that receive a 
permanent injunction at the district court are almost always affirmed on the 
merits on appeal, while patentees that lose on a permanent injunction 
motion received a favorable decision only about half the time (i.e., reversed, 
vacated, and/or remanded). In other words, the Federal Circuit appears 
inclined toward awarding injunctions—a property-rule remedy against 
future infringement—when a patent is found to be infringed and not invalid. 
Notably, this finding suggests that the Federal Circuit is attempting to 
correct ex post the district courts’ efforts to limit the availability of 
injunctive relief post-eBay. Numerous scholars, including us, have 
previously critiqued district courts’ application of eBay, arguing that they 
have effectively interpreted the decision to create de facto rules denying 
injunctive relief to certain categories of patentees like non-competitors and 
non-practicing entities.
273
 By generally affirming decisions where injunctive 
relief was granted while overturning around half of decisions where 
injunctions were denied, the Federal Circuit appears to be sending a clear 
                                                     
272. Id. at 1342. 
273. See, e.g., Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 99, at 244–45 (“The Supreme Court’s eBay 
opinion specifically indicated that courts should not adopt a ‘categorical rule’ denying injunctions 
for nonpracticing entities . . . . Nonetheless, commentators have reported that district courts’ actual 
practice appears substantially to conform to the forbidden rule. If true, the practical result of the 
lower courts’ application of eBay is an approach to injunctive relief that systematically disfavors 
patentees who lack the resources to commercialize their processes or products directly or 
immediately.” (footnotes omitted)); Holte, supra note 9, at 719–23 (explaining how district courts’ 
application of eBay and reliance of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence have “greatly diminished” the 
availability of injunctive relief, particularly for non-practicing entities) ; Seaman, supra note 5, at 
1953 (contending that “district courts appear to have adopted a de facto rule against injunctive relief 
for [patent assertion entities] and other patent owners who do not directly compete in a product 
market against an infringer”); Venkatesan, supra note 133, at 30 (“District courts have almost 
without exception divided patentees into two camps—those who sell or manufacture products and 
compete against the infringers, and those who have not commercialized their inventions and seek to 
earn revenues from licensing. The former have generally been granted injunctions, whereas 
nonpracticing patentees have generally been denied.”); cf. Jeremy Mulder, The Aftermath of eBay: 
Predicting When District Courts Will Grant Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 67, 81–82 (2007) (noting that “post-eBay courts view the patentee as entitled to an 
injunction to protect its patented invention from direct competition,” but that “the other side of this 
normative view leaves indirect competition beyond the reach of equitable remedy”). 
09 - Holte Seaman.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/5/2017  2:20 PM 
200 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:145 
 
signal that district courts should be more expansive in awarding injunctive 
relief. 
In particular, the Federal Circuit appears to be more willing to entertain 
requests by non-practicing entities for a permanent injunction than district 
courts. As explained, previous empirical studies found that district courts 
rarely grant injunctive relief to PAEs.
274
 Although the number of cases 
where the Federal Circuit reached a merits decision on injunctive relief 
involving a PAE was small, it is notable that the Federal Circuit ruled in 
favor of the PAE in two of these three cases.
275
 Indeed, the Federal Circuit 
has held that the patentee’s failure to practice the asserted patent does not 
necessarily bar it from obtaining permanent injunctive relief.
276
 
Another consequence of the Federal Circuit’s preference for injunctive 
relief may be an increase in the aggregate value of patents. Backed by an 
injunction, a patent owner can exclude others from practicing the patented 
technology—under the penalty of contempt of court
277
—unless the infringer 
is willing to pay a licensing fee that the patent owner accepts as sufficient 
compensation for its loss of exclusivity.
278
 As the Federal Circuit noted in 
its 2005 decision in eBay, “[i]f the injunction gives the patentee additional 
leverage in licensing, that is a natural consequence of the right to 
                                                     
274. See supra notes 91–97 and accompanying text (finding that PAEs received injunctions only 
16% of the time from district courts); Chien & Lemley, supra note 6, at 10 (finding that PAEs 
receive injunctions only 7% of the time when contested). 
275. See Whitserve LLC v. Comput. Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (vacating and 
remanding the district court’s decision denying an injunction to a PAE); i4i Ltd. P’ship. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court’s grant of an injunction 
to a PAE). In the third case, the Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the district court’s denial of an 
injunction to a PAE without discussion. Cygnus Telecomms. Tech., LLC v. WorldPort Comm’cns, 
Inc., 302 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
276. See, e.g., Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1363 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (overturning denial of permanent injunction despite the fact that the patentee did 
not practice the patent-in-suit, noting “[d]irect competition in the same market is certainly one factor 
suggesting strongly the potential for irreparable harm”); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 
F.3d 683, 702–03 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming permanent injunction where Broadcom sold indirectly 
competing, non-practicing product, supporting showing of irreparable harm); cf. Trebro Mfg., Inc. 
v. Firefly Equipment, LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that the district court 
erred in denying a preliminary injunction, despite the fact that “[the patentee] does not presently 
practice the patent”); High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 
1551, 1556–57 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reversing grant of preliminary injunction due to “lack of 
commercial activity by the patentee,” but noting “a patentee’s failure to practice an invention does 
not necessarily defeat the patentee’s claim of irreparable harm”). 
277. See, e.g., TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
278. See David O. Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49 GA. L. 
REV. 79, 157 (2014) (explaining that “injunctive relief requires an infringer wishing to remove the 
right of the patent owner to exclude the infringer from using the patented technology to buy that 
right from the patent owner in a . . . voluntary transaction at the subjective price agreed to by the 
patent owner”). 
09 - Holte Seaman.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/5/2017  2:20 PM 




 As a result, an injunction can give the “patentee a very 
powerful bargaining chip in licensing and settlement negotiations.”
280
 In 
sum, the Federal Circuit’s apparent inclination toward injunctive relief—
and thus more valuable patent rights—lends supports to the claim that the 
Federal Circuit has used its position as the primary appellate court over 
patent claims to shape the law in a pro-patentee direction.
281
 
There appears to be, however, one notable exception to the Federal 
Circuit’s apparent preference for injunctive relief: medical device cases. As 
previously explained, the district court affirmed injunction denials in 4 of 9 
cases that involved a patent covering a medical device.
282
 This may be due 
to the final eBay factor, whether the public interest would be disserved by 
an injunction; courts appear sensitive to concerns about potential adverse 
impacts on patients if an infringing device is enjoined without an available 
adequate substitute.
283
 However, loss of the right to exclude via an 
injunction may dampen incentives to innovate in the medical device 
industry, as it may lower patent value in a field where the costs of 




Finally, our study finds that stays are relatively under-utilized; they are 
granted only about one-quarter of the time when an injunction is 
imposed.
285
 Stays and other forms of delaying injunctive relief, such as 
“sunset” periods that allow for infringing sales to continue for a fixed period 
                                                     
279. MercExchange L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 547 U.S. 
388 (2006). 
280. Lily Lim & Sarah E. Craven, Injunctions Enjoined; Remedies Restructured, 25 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 787, 792 (2009). 
281. See supra note 121 and sources cited therein. 
282. See supra notes 257, 262–65 and accompanying text. 
283. See Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (acknowledging 
that in some cases “the public interest factor may so strongly weigh against enjoining the infringer 
that an injunction would be inappropriate”); Seaman, supra note 5, at 1999 n.311 and cases cited 
therein (noting that “several district court decisions have declined to award injunctive relief on the 
basis that it would disserve the public interest to restrict doctors’ and patients’ access to the 
infringing [medical] devices”). 
284. See Ronald J. Schutz & Patrick M. Arenz, Non-Practicing Entities and Permanent 
Injunctions Post-eBay, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 203, 209 (2011) (explaining that while the public 
interest factor “is often most relevant in medical devices directly affecting health, a broader point 
can be made [that] ongoing royalties—as opposed to injunctions—reduce innovation further” in this 
industry); Laura Masterson, Note, The Future of Medical Device Patents: Categorical Exclusion 
After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 274, 298 (2014) (explaining 
that “[t]he grant of a limited monopoly allows pioneer medical device firms to obtain financing 
required for the tremendous expense associated with research and development, clinical trials, and 
the expensive [premarket approval] process”). 
285. See supra section III.A.3. 
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of time, could be more widely used to avoid the alleged “holdup” costs 
associated with injunctions.
286
 Litigants and courts should consider delaying 
implementation of injunctive relief in situations where it would permit the 
accused infringer to timely implement a design around,
287
 usually 
contingent upon paying an ongoing royalty during the period before the 
injunction becomes effective.
288
 However, stays and other time-based 
delays of injunctive relief should not result in an extended postponement 
that would lead to an effective loss of the patentee’s right to exclude.
289
 The 
appropriateness of a stay would, of course, depend on the individual 
circumstances of each case. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings from this empirical study indicate that the Federal 
Circuit is generally more favorable to prevailing patentees regarding 
permanent injunctive relief than the district courts following eBay. 
District courts that grant an injunction after a finding of liability are 
highly likely to be affirmed on appeal, whereas district courts that deny 
an injunction have a significantly lower affirmance rate. This suggests 
that the Federal Circuit is generally inclined toward a property rule 
rather than a liability rule as a remedy against future patent infringement. 
It also appears to lend support to claims by scholars and others that the 
Federal Circuit, as a specialized court with a large number of patent 
cases, is more pro-patentee than the generalist district courts. 
  
                                                     
286. See supra note 90 and sources cited therein (describing the holdup problem). 
287. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 90, at 2038 (contending that “[i]f the infringing firm 
claims that it can design around the patent, the court should issue a stay of its permanent injunction 
that is long enough to permit the infringing firm to complete the redesign, if there is one, in an 
efficient and timely manner”). 
288. See, e.g., ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., Nos. 2011–1538, –1567, 
2012–1129, –1201, 2012 WL 10716768, at *1–2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 2, 2012) (granting a stay of a 
permanent injunction for a six-month “sunset” period, contingent upon the accused infringer posting 
a bond for the payment of “sunset royalties that became due during the sunset period”); 
MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Rexam PLC, No. 1:10–CV–511, 2012 WL 2153165, at *6 (E.D. Va. June 
12, 2012) (“When an injunction includes a sunset provision, courts may set a royalty rate for that 
period.”). 
289. Cf. Denicolò et al., supra note 205, at 596 (contending that routine granting of stays of 
permanent injunctions “whenever it is very costly or even impossible to design [around] the product 
in a non-infringing way . . . would penalize the most valuable patents—precisely, those that are the 
most difficult to circumvent even with full knowledge of the patent”). 
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APPENDIX A: TABLE OF CASES 
 





Langton 2014-1253 589 F. App’x 536 
XpertUniverse, Inc. Cisco Sys., Inc. 2014-1328 597 F. App’x 630 
TransPerfect Global, 
Inc. 
MotionPoint Corp. 2015-1165 N/A 
Global Traffic Techs., 
LLC 
Emtrac Sys, Inc. 2014-1537 2015 WL 3513416 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co. 
Mylan Pharms., Inc. 2014-1141 N/A 
CardSoft, Inc. VeriFone Holdings, 
Inc. 
2014-1135 769 F.3d 1114 
WBIP, LLC Kohler Co. 2015-1038 2016 WL 3902668 
Stryker Corp. Zimmer Inc. 2013-1668 782 F.3d 649 
Smith & Nephew, Inc. Interlace Med., Inc. N/A N/A 
WesternGeco L.L.C. ION Geophysical 
Corp. 
2013-1527 791 F.3d 1340 
Halo Elecs., Inc. Pulse Elecs., Inc. 2013-1472 769 F.3d 1371 
Alps South, LLC The Ohio Willow 
Wood Co. 
2013-1452 787 F.3d 1379 
Allergan, Inc. Apotex Inc. et al. 2013-1245 754 F.3d 952 
Unicom Monitoring, 
LLC 
Cencom, Inc. N/A N/A 
In re Armodafinil 
Patent Litig. 





2013-1324 774 F.3d 968 
VirnetX Inc. Apple Inc. 2013-1489 767 F.3d 1308 
Brocade Commc’ns 
Sys. Inc. 
A10 Networks, Inc. 2013-1210 N/A 
Apple, Inc. Samsung Elecs. Co., 
Ltd. 
2013-1129 735 F.3d 1352 
E2Interactive, Inc. Blackhawk 
Network, LLC 
2013-1151 561 F. App’x 895 
Graphic Packaging 
Intern., Inc. 
C.W. Zumbiel Co. 2012-1672 N/A 
Coloplast A/S Generic Med. 
Devices, Inc. 
N/A N/A 
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Teva Pharms. USA, 
Inc. 
Sandoz, Inc. 2012-1567 723 F.3d 1363 
Integrated Tech. Corp. Rudolph Techs., Inc. 2012-1593 734 F.3d 1352 
Pfizer Inc. Teva Pharms. 
U.S.A., Inc. 
2012-1576 555 F. App’x 961 
Valeant Int’l Watson Pharms., 
Inc. 
2012-1117 534 F. App’x 999 
Gen. Elec. Co. Mitsubishi Heavy 
Indus. Ltd. 
2013-1500 N/A 
Fractus, S.A. Samsung Elecs. Co., 
Ltd. 
2012-1633 N/A 
Motorola, Inc. Apple, Inc. 2012-1548 757 F.3d 1286 
Apple, Inc. Motorola, Inc. 2012-1549 757 F.3d 1286 
St. Jude Med. Inc. Access Closure Inc. 2012-1452 729 F.3d 1369 
Research Found. of 
State Univ. of NY 
Mylan Pharm. 2012-1523 531 F. App’x 1008 
Schering Corp. Mylan Pharm. 2012-1434 496 F. App’x 87 
Layne Christensen Co. Bro-Tech Corp. 
d/b/a The Purolite 
Co. 
2012-1178 N/A 
Hospira, Inc. Sandoz Int’l GmbH 2012-1426 N/A 
Meadwestvaco Corp. Rexam PLC 2012-1518 731 F.3d 1258 
Broadcom Corp. Emulex Corp. 2012-1309 732 F.3d 1325 
Medtronic Sofamor 
Danek USA, Inc., 
Nuvasive, Inc. 2013-1576 778 F.3d 1365 
Conceptus, Inc. Hologic, Inc. 2012-1209 2012 WL 
10242277 
Accentra, Inc. Staples, Inc. 2012-1237 500 Fed App’x 922 






2011-1538 694 F.3d 1312 
Hurricane Shooters, 
LLC 
EMI Yoshi Inc. N/A N/A 





2012-1489 748 F.3d 1354 
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Versata Software Inc. SAP Am., Inc. 2012-1029 717 F.3d 1255 
Lighting Ballast 
Control LLC 
Philips Elecs. N. 
Am. Corp. 
2012-1014 498 F. App’x 986 
Belden Tech. Inc. Superior Essex 
Communications LP 
2011-1608 N/A 
Peach State Labs, Inc. Envtl. Mfg. 
Solutions, LLC 
N/A N/A 
Pozen Inc. Par Pharma. Inc. 2011-1584 696 F.3d 1151 
Inventio AG Otis Elevator Co. 2009-1146 593 F.3d 1275 
Midtronics Inc. Aurora Performance 2011-1589 475 F. App’x 764 
Soitec MEMC Elec. 
Materials, Inc. 
2011-1534 N/A 
LG Elecs. USA Inc Whirlpool Corp. N/A N/A 
Metso Minerals Inc. Powerscreen Int’l 
Distrib. Ltd. 
2011-1572 526 F. App’x 988 
ePlus, Inc. Lawson Software, 
Inc. 
2011-1396 700 F.3d 509 
3D Sys., Inc. Envisiontec, Inc. 2011-1340 426 F. App’x 914 
B. Braun Melsungen 
AG 
Terumo Corp. 2011-1400 2012 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 6086 
WhitServe LLC Computer Packages, 
Inc. 
2011-1206 694 F.3d 10 
Douglas Dynamics, 
LLC 
Buyers Prods. Co. 2011-1291 717 F.3d 1336 
Harris Corp. Fed. Express Corp. 2012-1094 502 F. App’x 957 
Affinity Labs of Texas 
LLC 
BMW N. Am., LLC 2011-1350 N/A 
K-Tec Vita-Mix 2011-1244 696 F.3d 1364 




Teva Pharms. 2011-1217 457 F. App’x 927 
Bendix Comm. Veh. 
Sys. Inc. 
Haldex Brake Prods. 
Corp. 
2011-1323 461 F. App’x 932 
Otsuka Pharm. Sandoz, Inc. 2011-1126 678 F.3d 1280 
Robert Bosch, LLC Pylon Mfg. Co. 2011-1096 659 F.3d 1142 
Stone Strong, LLC Delzotto Prods. of 
Fla., Inc. 
2011-1156 455 F. App’x 964 
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Streck, Inc. Research & 
Diagnostic Sys., Inc. 
2011-1044 665 F.3d 1269 
O2 Micro Int’l, Ltd. Beyond Innovation 
Tech. Co. 
2011-1054 449 F. App’x 923 
Input/Output, Inc. 
(ION) 
Sercel, Inc. 2011-1255 419 F. App’x 988 
Marine Polymer 
Techs., Inc. 





2011-1010 456 F. App’x 886 
ClearValue, Inc. Pearl River 
Polymers, Inc. 
2011-1078 668 F.3d 1340 
Soverain Software 
LLC 







Alcon, Inc. Teva Pharms. USA, 
Inc. 
2010-1097 N/A 
In re Alfuzosin 
Hydrochloride Patent 
Litig. 
 N/A N/A 
Dow Chem. Corp. Nova Chems. Corp. 2010-1526 803 F.3d 620 
Custom Designs of 
Nashville Inc. 
Alsa Corp. N/A N/A 
Cordance Corp. Amazon.com, Inc. 2010-1502 658 F.3d 1330 
Woods Deangelo Marine 
Exhaust, Inc. 
2010-1478 692 F.3d 1272 
Mitsubushi Chem. 
Corp. 
Barr Laboratories 2010-1432 435 F. App’x 927 
LaserDynamics Inc Quanta Computer, 
Inc 
2011-1440 694 F.3d 51 
Smith & Nephew Inc. Arthrex, Inc. 2010-1427 453 F. App’x 977 










2013-1624 579 F. App’x 1005 
Parker-Hannifin Corp. Wix Filtration Corp. 2011-1347 N/A 
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Humanscale Corp. CompX Int’l Inc. 2010-1549 457 F. App’x 921 
Johnson & Johnson 
Vision Care 
CIBA Vision Corp. 2010-1372 N/A 
Ricoh Co. Quanta Computer 
Inc. 
2010-1332 N/A 
Presidio Components Amer. Tech. 
Ceramics 
2010-1355 702 F.3d 1351 
Judkins HT Window 
Fashions Corp. 
2010-1336 416 F. App’x 903 
Eli Lilly & Co. Sicor Pharms, Inc. 2010-1342 426 F. App’x 892 
Arlington Indus. Inc. Bridgeport Fittings, 
Inc. 
2010-1377 477 F. App’x 740 
Mytee Prods., Inc. Harris Research, 
Inc. 
2010-1207 439 F. App’x 882 
Emcore Corp. Optium Corp. 2010-1258 408 F. App’x 355 
Innovention Toys, 
LLC 
MGA Entm’t, Inc. 2010-1290 637 F.3d 1314 
I-Flow Corp. Apex Med. Tech., 
Inc 
N/A N/A 
IGT Bally Gaming Int’l 
Inc. 
2010-1364 659 F.3d 1109 
Creative Internet 
Advertising Corp. 
Yahoo Inc. 2010-1215 476 F. App’x 724 
Japan Cash Machine 
Co. 
MEI, Inc. 2010-1069 400 F. App’x 563 
Cummins-Allison 
Corp. 
SBM Co., Ltd. 2011-1049 484 F. App’x 499 
Monsanto Co. Bowman 2010-1068 657 F.3d 1341 




2010-1080 626 F.3d 1361 
Eli Lilly & Co. Teva Pharms. USA, 
Inc. 
2009-1071 619 F.3d 1329 
Flexiteek Ams., Inc. PlasTEAK, Inc. 2009-1501 400 F. App’x 559 
Spectralytics Inc. Cordis Corp. 2009-1564 649 F.3d 1336 
Unigene Laboratories, 
Inc. 
Apotex Inc. et al. 2010-1006 655 F.3d 1352 
August Tech. Corp. Camtek Ltd. 2010-1458 655 F.3d 1278 
Merck Sharp & 
Dohme Pharm. SRL 
Teva Pharm. USA, 
Inc. 
2010-1009 N/A 
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Finjan Software Ltd. Secure Computing 
Corp. 
2009-1576 626 F.3d 1197 
i4i LP Microsoft Corp. 2009-1504 598 F.3d 831 
Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. Mylan Pharms. 2009-1511 619 F.3d 1346 
Medtronic Sofamor 
Danek USA, Inc., 
Globus Med., Inc. 2009-1525 416 F. App’x 67 
iLight Techs., Inc. Fallon Luminous 
Prods. Corp. 
2009-1342 375 F. App’x 21 
Transamerica Life Ins. 
Co. 
Lincoln Nat’l Life 
Ins. Co. 
2009-1403 609 F.3d 1364 
Haemonetics Corp. Baxter Healthcare 
Corp. 
2009-1557 607 F.3d 776 
Hypoxico Inc. Colorado Altitude 
Training 
2014-1544 608 F. App’x 946 
Koninklijke Philips 
Elecs. NV 
Power Media CD 
Tek, Inc. 
N/A N/A 
Mass Eng’d Design, 
Inc. 
Ergotron, Inc. N/A N/A 
Bard Peripheral 
Vascular 
W.L. Gore & 
Assocs., Inc 
2010-1510 670 F.3d 1171 
Kowalski Mommy Gina Tuna 
Resources 
2009-1332 366 F. App’x 149 
Joyal Prods., Inc. Johnson Elec. N. 
Am., Inc. 
2009-1095 335 F. App’x 48 
Hynix Semiconductor, 
Inc. 
Rambus Inc. 2009-1299 645 F.3d 1336 
Global Traffic Techs. 
LLC 
Tomar Elecs., Inc 2009-1220 356 F. App’x 383 
U.S. Philips Corp. Iwasaki Elec. Co 2009-1252 449 F. App’x 1 
Ariba Inc. Emptoris Inc. 2009-1230 2010 WL 55625 
Telcordia Techs., Inc. Cisco Sys., Inc. 2009-1175 612 F.3d 1365 
Funai Elec. Co., Ltd. Daewoo Elecs. 
Corp. 
2009-1225 616 F.3d 1357 
Sensormatic Elec. 
Corp. 
The Tag Co. 2009-1193 367 F. App’x 143 






2009-1169 345 F. App’x 563 
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Smith & Nephew Inc. Arthrex Inc. 2009-1091 355 F. App’x 384 
American Calcar Inc. American Honda 
Motor Co. 
2009-1503 651 F.3d 1318 
Callaway Golf Co. Acushnet Co. 2009-1076 576 F.3d 1331 
Cam Guard Sys., Inc. Smart Sys. Techs, 
Inc. 
N/A N/A 











2009-1014 356 Fed App’x 389 
Gemtron Corp. Saint-Gobain Corp. 2009-1001 572 F.3d 1371 
Pressure Prods. Med. 
Supplies Inc. 
Quan Emerteq Corp. 2008-1602 599 F.3d 1308 
TruePosition, Inc. Andrew Corp. 2009-1389 389 F. App’x 1000 
Emory Univ. Nova Biogentics N/A N/A 






2008-1508 329 F. App’x 266 
Trading Tech. Int’l eSpeed 2008-1392 595 F.3d 1340 
Kowalski Ocean Duke Corp. 2008-1364 316 F. App’x 986 
Power-One, Inc. Artesyn Techs., Inc. 
(Emerson) 
2008-1501 599 F.3d 1343 
Fresenius USA, Inc. Baxter Int’l Inc. 2008-1306 582 F.3d 1288 
Chase Med., L.P. CHF Techs., Inc. 2008-1335 311 F. App’x 343 
Ecolab, Inc. FMC Corp. 2008-1228 569 F.3d 1335 
Orion IP, LLC Mercedes-Benz 
USA 
2009-1130 605 F.3d 967 
Avid Identification 
Sys. 
Philips Elecs. N. 
Am. Corp. 
2009-1216 603 F.3d 967 
Blackboard Inc. Desire2Learn Inc. 2008-1368 574 F.3d 1371 
Amgen F. Hoffman-
LaRoche Ltd. 






2008-1351 302 F. App’x 921 
ResQNet.com, Inc. Lansa, Inc. 2008-1365 594 F.3d 860 
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Respironics, Inc. Invacare Corp. 2008-1164 303 F. App’x 865 
Broadcom Corp. Qualcomm, Inc. 2008-1199 543 F.3d 683 
DePuy Spine, Inc. Medtronic Sofamor 
DA 
2008-1240 567 F.3d 1314 
Celerity, Inc. Ultra Clean Holding 
Inc. 
2008-1205 296 F. App’x 45 
Acumed, LLC Stryker Corp. 2008-1124 551 F.3d 1323 
Martek Biosciences 
Corp. 
Nutrinova, Inc. 2008-1459 579 F.3d 1363 
Sundance, Inc. DeMonte 
Fabricating Ltd. 
2008-1068 550 F.3d 1356 
Koninklijke Philips 
Elecs. NV 
Int’l Disc Mfrs. N/A N/A 
Baden Sports, Inc. Kabushiki Kaisha 
Molten 
2008-1216 556 F.3d 1300 
Telecomm. Sys, Inc. Mobile 365, Inc. 2009-1348 363 F. App’x 743 
Allan Block Corp. E. Dillon & Co. 2008-1014 287 F. App’x 109 
Johns Hopkins Univ. Datascope Corp. 2007-1530 543 F.3d 1342 
Muniauction, Inc. Thomson Corp. 2007-1485 532 F.3d 1318 
MercExchange, LLC eBay, Inc. 2007-1531 273 F. App’x 857 
Diomed, Inc. Angiodynamics, Inc. 2007-1475 310 F. App’x 366 
Sanofi-Synthelabo Apotex, Inc. 2007-1438 550 F.3d 1075 
Commonwealth Sci. & 




2007-1449 542 F.3d 1363 
Brooktrout, Inc. Eicon Networks 
Corp. 





2007-1417 282 F. App’x 836 
Lexion Med Inc. Northgate Techs. 
Inc. 
2007-1420 292 F. App’x 42 
Informatica Corp. Business Objects 
Data Integration, 
Inc. 
2008-1123 299 F. App’x 965 
Proveris Scientific 
Corp. 
Innovasystems, Inc. 2007-1428 536 F.3d 1256 
MGM Well Servs., 
Inc. 
Mega Lift Sys., LLC 2007-1367 264 F. App’x 900 
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800 Adept, Inc. Murex Securities, 
Ltd. 
2007-1272 539 F.3d 1354 
Praxair, Inc. ATMI, Inc. 2007-1483 543 F.3d 1306 
O2 Micro Int’l, Ltd. Beyond Innovation 
Tech. Co. 
2007-1302 521 F.3d 1351 
Ortho-McNeil Pharm., 
Inc. 
Mylan Labs Inc. 2007-1223 520 F.3d 1358 
Amado Microsoft Corp. 2007-1236 517 F.3d 1353 
Verizon Servs. Corp. Vonage Holdings 
Corp. 
2007-1240 503 F.3d 1295 
Atlanta Attachment 
Co. 
Leggett & Platt, Inc. 2007-1188 516 F.3d 1361 
Momentus Golf, Inc. Swingrite Golf 
Corp. 
N/A N/A 





2007-1405 278 F. App’x 1004 
MPT, Inc. Marathon Labels, 
Inc. 
2007-1183 258 F. App’x 318 
Exergen Corp. CVS Corp. 2006-1491 575 F.3d 1312 
Innogenetics, N.V. Abbott Labs. 2007-1145 512 F.3d 1363 







Visto Corp. Seven Networks, 
Inc. 
2007-1155 N/A 
Cybersettle, Inc. Nat’l Arbitration 
Forum, Inc. 
2007-1092 243 F. App’x 603 
Black & Decker Inc. Robert Bosch Tool 
Corp. 
2007-1243 260 F. App’x 284 
Color Kinetics, Inc. Super Vision Int’l, 
Inc. 
N/A N/A 
Omegaflex, Inc. Parker Hannifin 
Corp. 
2007-1044 243 F. App’x 592 
Janssen Pharm. Dr. Reddy’s 
Laboratories 
2007-1021 223 F. App’x 999 
Rosco, Inc. Mirror Lite Co. 2010-1086 394 Fed. App’x 714 
Smith & Nephew, Inc. Synthes (U.S.A.) 2007-1048 269 F. App’x 972 
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Int’l Rectifier IXYS Corp. 2007-1063 515 F.3d 1353 
Voda Cordis Corp. 2007-1297 536 F.3d 1311 
Finisar Corp. DirecTV Group Inc. 2007-1023 523 F.3d 1323 
Pods, Inc. Porta Stor, Inc. 2006-1504 484 F.3d 1359 
Litecubes, LLC Northern Light 
Prods., Inc. 
2006-1646 523 F.3d 1353 
TiVo Echostar (Dish 
Network) 
2006-1574 516 F.3d 1290 
Paice LLC Toyota Motor Corp. 2006-1610 504 F.3d 1293 
Brinton Loggans 2006-1611 214 F. App’x 984 
Wald Mudhopper Oilfield 
Servs., Inc. 
N/A N/A 
z4 Microsoft Corp. 2006-1638 507 F.3d 1340 
Edwards Lifesciences 
AG 
CoreValve, Inc. 2011-1215 699 F.3d 1305 
 
 
